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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This study presents an estimate of the probability that a single earthquake could cause 
simultaneous operational failure of geographically disperse data centers operated by a 
California utility. Three facilities are considered: a grid control facility (denoted herein by 
GCF), a data processing facility (DPF), and a backup data facility (BDF) that can perform 
the functions of either GCF or DPF, should either be rendered inoperative. This study 
estimates two probabilities: (1) that within the next 5 years a single earthquake could render 
both the grid control and backup facilities inoperative; and (2) that within the next 5 years a 
single earthquake could render both the data processing and backup facilities inoperative.  
The work was performed by researchers at the California Institute of Technology in 
Pasadena, CA, in collaboration with researchers at the United States Geological Survey in 
Pasadena, CA and Golden, CO. Caltech designed and directed the research, examined the 
seismic vulnerability of the three sites, and quantified the two probabilities desired. The 
USGS performed the hazard analysis.  
Hazard analysis. The USGS created a database of 250,000 earthquake scenarios that 
could affect the three sites. The database includes information about the probability 
distribution of shaking at each site under each scenario earthquake. The database uses the 
same authoritative seismological and other mathematical information as the USGS 2002 
National Seismic Hazard Maps. Important outcomes of the hazard analysis are that:  
(1) The most severe earthquake scenarios for the primary facilities and for the backup 
facility are, respectively, the Puente Hills and San Joaquin Hills faults. The largest 
earthquakes on these faults could cause potentially damaging shaking at all three facilities, 
with median peak ground accelerations shown in Table E-1. For reference, 0.05g is 
commonly considered the threshold of damaging PGA, and shaking in the epicentral region 
of the Northridge earthquake was on the order of PGA = 0.9g. 
Table E-1: Median shaking intensities in most severe earthquake scenarios 
Median* PGA in scenario earthquake Facility 
M7.4 Puente Hills M7 San Joaquin Hills 
Data processing facility 0.92g 0.15g 
Grid control facility 0.82g 0.12g 
Backup data facility 0.23g 0.65g 
* These are best-estimate shaking intensities; they could be 60% higher or more. 
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(2) The siting of the backup facility is effective at reducing the probability of 
simultaneous failure: because the backup is located far from the primary facilities, even 
given the most serious earthquake (the Puente Hills event), it is unlikely that shaking in 
excess of approximately 0.2g will occur at both the primary and backup facility. 
Vulnerability analysis. The utility has taken extensive action to control the seismic 
vulnerability of its facilities. In a detailed examination of the equipment at each facility, we 
found that almost all equipment appear to have been seismically restrained, and that there is 
extensive redundancy of building service equipment, including multiple sources of 
uninterruptible power supply (UPS), emergency generators (and in one case multiple parallel 
emergency generators), and air conditioning (crucial to computer operations). Corporate real 
estate personnel and building engineers informed us of ongoing efforts to enhance the 
seismic resistance of equipment, most notably the seismic bracing of raised access flooring, 
an expensive and time-consuming effort that is being performed over the space of several 
years. In addition to concerns about the remaining unbraced raised access flooring, there are 
a few remaining conditions that may represent important weak links, where remediating 
them might substantially reduce failure probability.  
1. Some critical computer equipment (tape silos, PC system units and monitors), some 
consoles in which critical computers are installed, and all cubicles in operationally 
critical areas appeared to lack seismic restraint.  
2. Long unbraced runs of sprinkler pipe were observed in some critical areas, and in many 
places there appeared to be potential for interaction between sprinkler pipe and 
ventilation ducts. In some of these areas, sprinklers are wet systems, meaning that 
damage to pipes could release water on sensitive electrical equipment below.  
3. Although emergency generators appeared to be seismically restrained, some critical 
components were not, such as day tanks, fuel pumps, and batteries used for starter 
motors. Failure of these unrestrained components could render the emergency generators 
inoperative.  
4. The data processing facility has cooling towers that lose water to evaporation. There is 
no on-site water supply in case of service interruption from the local utility.  
Risk analysis. The probability that both the data processing facility and the backup 
facility will fail in a single earthquake in the next five years is estimated to be 0.4%. The 
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probability that both the grid control facility and the backup facility will fail in a single 
earthquake in the next five years is estimated to be 0.05%. By remediating all items notes in 
the vulnerability analysis as “possible weak links,” the probability of either failure is 
estimated to be less than 1 in 100,000. Details are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Risk analysis results: estimated failure probability within the next 5 years 
Conditions Data processing 
facility 
Backup data 
facility 
Grid control 
facility 
Data processing and 
backup 
Grid control and 
backup 
Current  0.055 0.032 0.008 0.004 0.0005
Remediate 
all 
0.002 0.001 0.003 < 1 x 10-5 < 1 x 10-5
 
Recommendations. We recommend remediating the few remaining unanchored items, 
and performing mechanical testing of existing anchorage (if such tests have not already been 
done). It may not be possible to make some of the unanchored items seismically rugged, 
particularly the tape silos, which we understand are very sensitive. Perhaps these could be 
placed in distant location without severe impact to their operation and maintenance.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 OBJECTIVES 
This section describes the principal objectives of the project. A California utility 
company is interested in understanding whether three data centers located within 100 miles 
of each other share a common seismic risk that could result in data processing or grid control 
being unavailable after a single earthquake. Let the facilities be denoted by GCF (grid control 
facility), DPF (data processing facility), and BDF (backup data facility). The analysis 
consists of data collection, hazard analysis, and quantitative risk assessment. In particular, it 
is desirable to estimate: 
• The probability that both the primary and backup data processing facilities (DPF 
and BDF) would be simultaneously rendered inoperative during a planning period 
of 5 years (i.e., between August 1, 2006 and July 30, 2011), because of a single 
earthquake.  
• The probability that both the primary and backup grid control facilities (GCF and 
BDF) would be simultaneously rendered inoperative during the same planning 
period. 
By “rendered inoperative” is meant that the facility is largely incapable of performing 
critical grid control or other data processing functions for a period of more than a few 
minutes, either because  
• the building is rendered unsafe to enter or occupy, i.e., red-tagged by local 
building department officials, or because  
• operational failure occurs to critical equipment systems: computers, mechanical, 
electrical, or plumbing components, to certain architectural components such as 
raised access floors, or to off-site utility services such as nearby electric 
substations. Such operational failure could occur because of shaking, earthquake 
sprinkler leakage, operator error, and possibly other reasons.  
We consider here only earthquake shaking and earthquake sprinkler leakage as causes of 
operational failure, so to that extent the risk analysis may underestimate the total probability 
of operational failure. (Other hazards include landslide, liquefaction, faulting, inundation, 
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fire, hazardous material spills, including hazmat from neighbors or nearby transportation 
corridors.) We consider in an approximate way the failure of off-site utility services.  
1.2 PROJECT PARTICIPANTS 
Staff of the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) led the project, developed the 
methodology, performed the facility data collection and systems analyses, performed the 
seismic risk analysis, and produced this report. The United States Geological Survey (USGS) 
performed the seismic hazard analysis. They identified possible future earthquakes that could 
occur and affect the sites and estimated the shaking intensity in each event and the frequency 
with which each event is expected to occur.  
1.3 APPROACH 
The analysis has three part: hazard analysis, vulnerability analysis, and risk analysis. In 
the hazard analysis, one estimates the frequency and severity of events that could affect the 
sites. In the vulnerability analysis, one estimates the consequences of an event, given its 
severity. In the risk analysis, one combines the results of the hazard analysis (what is the 
frequency of damaging events) and the vulnerability analysis (what are the consequences 
given an event’s severity) to estimate the resulting frequency with which various 
consequences occur. These steps are now briefly summarized. 
1.4 ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT 
Section 1 (this section) has presented the study objectives, briefly identified the project 
participants, and summarized the approach. Section 2 summarizes the hazard analysis, i.e., it 
deals with the earthquakes and site shaking at each site. Section 3 presents the vulnerability 
analysis, i.e., the relationship between shaking intensity and loss of function. Section 4 
presents the risk analysis, i.e., considering (a) how frequently the earthquakes occur and (b) 
the loss of function given each earthquake, what is the likelihood within a given planning 
period (here, 5 years) that loss of function will occur. Section 5 summarizes our findings. 
Section 6 presents complete bibliographic references for sources cited here.  
Appendices A, B, and C contain fault trees developed to depict the events that could 
cause failure of the facilities. Appendix D lists limitations of the study. Appendix E 
summarizes defensibility and state-of-the-art aspects of this study. 
 Analysis of Simultaneous Operational Failure of Critical Facilities due to Earthquake, for a California Utility 
 3 
2 HAZARD ANALYSIS 
2.1 HAZARD ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
2.1.1 Purpose of the hazard analysis 
The purpose of the hazard analysis is (1) to identify the earthquakes that could affect each 
site, (2) to estimate the intensity of shaking at each site from each earthquake, and (3) to 
estimate the probability that the earthquake would occur. (More precisely, we estimate the 
mean rate at which each of a large number of possible earthquake scenarios occur, and the 
probability distribution of shaking at each site.) Other seismic hazards are considered 
qualitatively.  
2.1.2 Probabilistic seismic hazard analysis 
While the technical details of the hazard analysis are quite complicated, a simple 
summary can be provided. Seismic hazard derives from the possible future rupture of 
earthquake faults. The fault rupture generates waves of motion that propagate through the 
earth to the surface, and result in shaking of the ground. The intensity of shaking depends on 
the earthquake magnitude, the direction and distance from the fault rupture to the site, and the 
stiffness of the soil near the ground surface at the site (more precisely for the technical 
reader, the average shearwave velocity in the upper 30 meters of soil, denoted here by Vs30), 
and certain other features of the fault rupture. In general, a larger magnitude, closer distance, 
and softer soil each act to increase the shaking at the site.  
Earthquake shaking at a given site is measured with a variety of ways, most commonly 
the peak ground acceleration (PGA), the maximum rate at which the velocity of the ground 
changes during an earthquake, measured in units of gravity. We used three measures of 
shaking intensity: peak ground acceleration, and two, additional standard measures that will 
not be defined here but will be noted for the technical reader: pseudo-acceleration spectral 
response at 0.2 second and 1.0 second periods, with 5% viscous damping. It is of interest here 
to estimate intensity by each measure at each of three sites.  
To do this, the following procedure is used: first, a map of the faults in the region is 
created, and the rate at which each fault produces earthquakes of various magnitudes is 
estimated. These comprise an earthquake rupture forecast; we used the same one employed 
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by the US Geological Survey to create the 2002 National Seismic Hazard Maps (detailed in 
Frankel et al. 2002).  
The analysis begins by selecting a given fault, a given magnitude, and a particular 
segment of the fault that must rupture to produce the given magnitude. Earthquake faults can 
produce a continuous range of magnitude, but for convenience we chose discrete values in 
0.05-magnitude increments. Each fault can produce a given magnitude earthquake along any 
portion of its length. That is, except in the largest events, only a portion of the fault actual 
ruptures. We discretized rupture locations in 5-km steps. The combination of fault, 
magnitude, and fault rupture segment is sometimes referred to as a scenario earthquake.  
Next, one uses a mathematical relationship between magnitude, distance from the rupture 
to the site, site soil characteristics, and shaking intensity to estimate the probability 
distribution of shaking at the site, given that scenario earthquake. The relationship is 
commonly called a seismic attenuation relationship, and is typically derived by fitting a 
smooth curve to a plot of data points from observations in past earthquakes. The attenuation 
relationship typically provides both a median value of shaking intensity and one or more 
measures of uncertainty. Here, several attenuation relationships are used, the same ones 
employed for the 2002 National Seismic Hazard Maps (namely, Atkinson and Silva 1997, 
Boore et al. 1997, Campbell and Bozorgnia 2003, and Sadigh et al. 1997). Median shaking 
intensity and uncertainty in shaking intensity are calculated for each site of interest for each 
scenario earthquake and each attenuation relationship.  
Furthermore, two measures of uncertainty are used: one to depict the variability of the 
median value of ground motion (which can vary between earthquakes, and be higher or lower 
over the entire affected area than the average earthquake—this is sometimes called the 
interevent variability), and one to depict the remaining uncertainty in ground motion (i.e., 
how shaking intensity can vary from site to site, in a given earthquake—this is called the 
intraevent variability). We used a standard source, Lee et al. (2000), to distinguish inter- and 
intraevent variability.  
Site soil characteristics can be found by reference to a soil map and checked to the extent 
possible with geotechnical reports for the facilities. The soil map used here was created in 
2000 by the California Geological Survey (Wills et al. 2000). Each site was located on the 
map using its latitude and longitude, determined from its street address using Microsoft 
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Streets and Trips (Microsoft Corp., 2004) and checked using Google Earth Plus (Google Inc., 
2005).  
To recap, the product of the seismic hazard analysis is a database containing estimates of 
the median and two measures of variability of shaking severity for each site, each fault, each 
magnitude, and each rupture location. The faults and rupture locations considered here were 
all those contained in a recent, authoritative USGS fault model that are located within 200 km 
of any of the three sites of interest. Approximately 3,000 faults and other sources of 
earthquakes (called background sources, where earthquakes are know to have occurred but 
no fault is known to exist) are examined. Considering magnitudes and rupture locations, 
approximately 62,000 scenario earthquakes are considered. After multiplying by 4 
attenuation relationships (also authoritative, having been selected by the USGS for its recent 
National Seismic Hazard Maps) and 3 levels of inter-event variability1, we calculated 
approximately 750,000 scenarios, and for each of three sites, three measures of shaking 
intensity, each with a median value, an estimate of intra-event variability, and a mean annual 
rate of occurrence.  
2.2 HAZARD ANALYSIS RESULTS 
The database described in the previous section was compiled. While the real importance 
of the database lies in its implications for operational failure probability, some aspects of the 
hazard data are interesting by themselves. We can identify the earthquake faults that produce 
the strongest shaking at each site.  
In terms of median peak ground acceleration (PGA), among all earthquake sources 
considered here, the newly identified Puente Hills blind thrust fault appears to be capable of 
producing the strongest shaking at both DPF and GCF. The largest magnitude event on this 
fault (M7.4) is estimated to produce (median) PGA at DPF and GCF of 0.92 and 0.82g, 
respectively. (Considering uncertainty, shaking could be as much as double this level of 
shaking with 10% probability. The technical reader should note that the attenuation 
relationship producing these levels of shaking is Boore et al. 1997, and that the 90th percentile 
refers to an arbitrary direction of motion, as discussed by Baker and Cornell 2006.) Even the 
median PGA represents very strong shaking, as strong as the most strongly shaken area of the 
1994 Northridge earthquake. In the same event, the median PGA at BDF is estimated to be 
                                                 
1 For the technical reader, the 3 levels of inter-event variability span are Gauss points. 
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0.2g. Although but far less severe than at DPF and GCF, this is potentially damaging 
shaking, approximately equal to that experienced at the Los Angeles City Hall in the 
Northridge earthquake. While we have yet to estimate the probability of operational failure at 
BDF in such an earthquake, 0.2g is well above the level considered negligible.  
The event that is estimated to produce the strongest shaking at BDF is a M7 event on the 
San Joaquin Hills Thrust fault, with median PGA at BDF equal to almost 0.7g, and median 
PGA at DPF and GCF of 0.15g and 0.12g, respectively. Again, considering uncertainty, 
PGAs in such an earthquake could be substantially greater. A map showing shaking 
intensities in both earthquakes is shown in Figure 2-1. 
   
Figure 2-1. Scenario earthquakes producing the strongest shaking at the facilities studied here. The left-
hand map shows shaking intensity in the events in a M7.4 Puente Hills blind thrust earthquake. The 
right-hand map shows shaking intensity in a M7 San Joaquin Hills thrust earthquake. The maps show 
the median estimated peak ground acceleration for this event (i.e., shaking with 50% exceedance 
probablity given the occurrence of this fault rupture). The boxes near the area of strongest shaking 
indicate the boundaries of the fault rupture. Facility locations are omitted for confidentiality.  
 
Considering all earthquakes that could affect these sites, we can estimate the frequency 
with which earthquakes occurs occur that cause PGA > 0.05 times the acceleration due to 
gravity (an approximate threshold for potentially damaging shaking). See Table 2-1. The 
third column in the table is simply 1 divided by the second column; it shows the average 
number of years between events causing PGA > 0.05g. Because the backup facility (BDF) 
provides a backup for both DPF and GCF, it is of interest to know how frequently 
earthquakes occur causing PGA > 0.05g at both DPF and BDF, or at both GCF and BDF. See 
Table 2-2. (For the technical reader, these frequencies reflect the sum of mean occurrence 
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rates of all scenario earthquakes where the median PGA > 0.05. Each of the four attenuation 
relationships is weighted equally.)  
Table 2-1. Average frequency of potentially damaging earthquakes 
Facility Average frequency of PGA > 0.05g
(times per year) 
Equivalent average 
return period (years)
Data processing facility 0.14 7.3 
Backup data facility 0.13 7.9 
Grid control facility 0.12 8.2 
 
Table 2-2. Average frequency of potentially damaging earthquakes affecting main and backup site 
Facilities Average frequency of PGA > 0.05g
(times per year) 
Equivalent average 
return period (years)
Data processing and backup 0.082 12 
Grid control and backup 0.071 14 
 
Figure 2-2 shows the mean frequency with which single earthquakes occur causing 
median PGA to exceed x times gravity at both the data processing facility and the backup 
facility, as a function of x. The figure shows the same information for shaking at both the grid 
control facility and the backup facility. Note that no scenario earthquakes are estimated to 
produce a median PGA > 0.25g at both DPF and BDF, or at both GCF and BDF. (The 
technical reader should note the word “median” in the previous sentence. It speaks to the 
PGA produced by each scenario earthquake with 50% probability, not with complete 
certainty, so there is some nonzero probability of PGA > 0.25g at two of the facilities.) 
Because earthquakes are estimated to produce shaking at each individual facility far more 
frequently than shown in Figure 2-2, one can observe an important success in siting the 
backup facility. Because of where the backup is located, far from each primary facility, it is 
unlikely that shaking in excess of 0.25g will occur at both the primary and backup facility 
even given the most serious earthquake examined here.  
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Figure 2-2. Two-site PGA hazard curves 
 
2.3 OTHER HAZARDS 
Other common seismic hazards include ground failure such as liquefaction, lateral 
spreading, and landslide; fault rupture at the ground surface directly beneath the building; fire 
following earthquake; and inundation due to dam failure. These hazards are considered here 
only briefly and qualitatively. We examined geotechnical reports for the subject facilities that 
were provided by the utility and found no indication that the geotechnical engineer 
considered liquefaction, lateral spreading, or landslide likely to occur. The sites are not 
located atop any known fault traces. Post-earthquake conflagration is a possibility in a large 
earthquake, more so for the grid control and data processing facilities than for the backup 
data facility, which has the advantage of being presently located in a largely open area near a 
fire station. All three facilities have concrete cladding, noncombustible roofs, and few 
window openings, all of which mitigate the potential for fire to spread from adjacent 
buildings. We have no information in our files about the potential for inundation due to dam 
failure; the utility should consider examine that possibility.  
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3 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
3.1 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
3.1.1 Purpose of the vulnerability analysis 
The purpose of the vulnerability analysis is to relate shaking intensity to its consequences 
at for a particular facility. In the present case, two consequences are of interest: red-tagging 
and loss of function due to nonstructural causes (equipment damage, etc.). Both are treated as 
“binary” events, meaning they are depicted as either occurring or not occurring, and nothing 
in between. (In fact, there are varying degrees of loss of function for these facilities, but the 
present analysis simplifies loss of function to make the analysis practical within the available 
time.) Both are treated probabilistically, meaning that given each of the scenario earthquakes, 
we desire to estimate the probability of red-tagging, loss of use, or both.  
3.1.2 Fault trees and fragility functions  
To calculate the probability of loss of use, we employ a methodology called fault-tree 
analysis. It was first used in connection to estimate the safety of the Minuteman Missile 
launch control system in 1962. It has since been used to assess the reliability of various 
complex systems. A fault tree is a diagram that shows, at its top, a box representing an 
undesirable outcome, such as “Grid control failure.” (See Figure 3-1.) The possible causes of 
the top event are depicted below in a row of events that could cause the top event, such as 
“red tagging” or “equipment failure.” These lower events are connected to the top event by 
lines and a logic symbol that indicates whether any of the lower events causes the top event 
(an “or” gate, i.e., the top event occurs if the first or the second or the third or any 
combination of the lower events occurs) or whether all of the lower events must occur to 
cause the to event (an “and” gate). There are other gates that can be used in fault-tree 
analysis, but only these two are used and explained here. Each lower event can be further 
broken down into even-lower events connected to the upper ones by logic gates, until the 
probability of all the lowest events (called basic events) can be estimated. Here, the basic 
events are red-tagging of the building and failure of various building and equipment 
components. The probabilities of the basic events must be estimated as a function of shaking 
intensity. See Appendices B, C, and D for fault trees for the facilities examined here. 
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Figure 3-1. Illustrative portion of a fault tree. The event at the top of the tree is the one whose probability 
is desired. Logic gates equate the occurrence of an upper event with events below it. The diagram 
indicates that grid control fails if either the building is red-tagged (i.e., declared by a building department 
official to be unsafe to enter or occupy) or the equipment fails. Equipment failure is further broken down 
into lower events. The triangles at the bottom indicate that this is only a portion of the complete tree, and 
that more basic events shown elsewhere contribute to the events at the bottom of the diagram.  
 
The relationship between shaking intensity and failure probability of a component is 
referred to here as a fragility function. The fragility function depends on what kind of 
component is shaken and its seismic installation conditions. For example, Johnson et al. 
(1999) provide several fragility functions for battery racks in uninterruptible power supply 
equipment, depending on whether the battery rack is anchored to the floor, has longitudinal 
braces, spacers between the batteries to prevent their pounding into each other and breaking 
their conductors, and other relevant features. Figure 3-2 illustrates fragility functions for 
battery racks, using parameters provided by Johnson et al. (1999).  
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Figure 3-2. Illustrative fragility functions for UPS battery racks. They show the probability that a battery 
rack will fail to operate after its base experiences various levels of acceleration. For example, if the 
battery rack lacks longitudinal cross bracing and experiences shaking of 1g (the acceleration due to 
gravity), there is an approximately 40% probability that it will be damaged to the extent that it will fail to 
operate after the earthquake (this is the point highlighted by the large black dot).  
 
To analyze the fault tree, one creates a mathematic equation for the probability of the top 
event as a function of the probabilities of the basic events. A complete treatment of the math 
is omitted here. Suffice it to say that the probability that event i occurs (denoted by Pi) if 
lower events 0, 1, 2, … and i-1 all occur is the product of the probabilities of the lower events 
(denoted by P0, P1, etc.): 
 And gate: 0 1 2 1...i iP P P P P−= × × ×  (1) 
while the probability that event i occurs if any one of the lower events occurs is given by 
 Or gate: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 2 11 1 1 1 ... 1i iP P P P P−= − − × − × − × × −  (2) 
(These equations ignore correlation for the sake of simplicity.) The equations can be 
combined for any tree comprised of and and or gates, resulting in a single equation for the 
occurrence of the top event as a function of the probabilities of the basic events. In the case 
of the fault tree shown in Figure 3-1, if we had the failure probabilities for each of the lowest 
four events (red-tagging, life-safety system failure, grid-control equipment fails, and building 
support system fail), we could estimate the probability that grid control fails as 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )4 0 1 2 31 1 1 1 1P P P P P= − − × − × − × −  (3) 
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where P4 denotes the grid control failure probability and P0 through P3 denote the probability 
of the contributing events.  
Since the probabilities of the basic events are themselves functions of shaking intensity 
(e.g., the base acceleration of an equipment component), one can calculate the probability of 
the top event as a function of shaking intensity, creating a fragility function for the top event.  
The probabilities P0, P1, etc., could refer to the probability of equipment failure or to the 
probability of red-tagging. To estimate the failure probability of equipment, we draw 
extensively from Johnson et al. (1999), who themselves compiled research performed for the 
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) and others. To estimate the failure probability of the 
structure (i.e., the probability of red-tagging), we use a combination of a state-of-the-practice 
performance-based earthquake engineering methodology created for the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency called FEMA 356 (American Society of Civil Engineers, 2000), and 
the standard methodology for post-earthquake building safety evaluations called ATC-20 
(Applied technology Council 1996). The combination is described in more detail later in this 
chapter. 
3.2 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS OF EQUIPMENT  
Caltech personnel performed site visits site visits on June 29 and 30, 2006 and July 5, 
2006 to observe and document the seismic condition of operational equipment (computers 
and other control equipment), and the structural and other nonstructural components on 
which the operational equipment depend. These observations were necessary to construct the 
fault trees. Several utility employees and contractors accompanied Caltech staff on each site 
visit. 
We observed operational equipment to develop an understanding of the components on 
which critical equipment system depend, their number and degree of redundancy (i.e., how 
many duplicate components exist that can perform a single function, even if one or more is 
rendered inoperative), and the installation and maintenance features that tend to be most 
important to their failure probability. By “failure probability” is meant the likelihood that a 
component will fail to operate after an earthquake as a result of overturning or other damage. 
For example, we examined the seismic anchorage of electrical cabinets to the floor slab 
beneath them, because seismic anchorage is strongly related to the probability that the cabinet 
would overturn in the event of an earthquake.  
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We also observed a few structural and architectural components relevant to the 
performance of operational equipment, mostly looking for features that indicate the potential 
for interaction between critical equipment and structural or other nonstructural components. 
For example, flexible equipment installed very close to structural members might pound into 
the structural member and be damaged. Another example is the raised access flooring on 
which computer equipment rests; if the flooring collapses the computer equipment can be 
damaged and rendered inoperative.  
We relied largely on the structural drawings for information about aspects of the 
structural system related to red-tag probability, since relevant details are typically largely 
concealed within the structural components themselves (for example, the steel reinforcing 
bars within a reinforced concrete member) or behind architectural finishes (e.g., steel 
connections under layers of fireproofing and gypsum wallboard)2.  
Note that throughout this report we frequently say, “appeared to lack seismic restraint” or 
“appeared to be anchored,” etc. We make the former kind of statement because in most cases 
it impossible or impractical to observe each piece of equipment from all vantage points, and 
to determine definitively that the no restraint was present. We make the latter kind of 
statement because, although we frequently observed what appeared to be anchor bolts or 
other restraints, we performed no mechanical tests to ensure that bolts or other anchors were 
actually secured to the slab or wall, or installed according to the manufacturer’s directions. 
There are well-known examples of the tops of bolts with nuts attached to them glued to 
equipment to make it appear that the bolts are properly anchored into slab or wall, but of 
course provide no seismic resistance.  
If the utility has not yet performed such tests, e.g., just after installation, it should 
consider doing so to ensure construction quality. 
3.2.1 Observations of equipment at grid control facility 
This facility was visited on June 29, 2006. It controls electric transmission within the 
utility’s territory. See Appendix A for the fault tree of this facility. 
Grid control room. The grid control room has a low 50-ft and 30 ft raised access floor on 
approximately 3-inch pedestals which appeared in at least some cases not be to secured to the 
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slab, in others possibly secured by mastic (Figure 3-3). Such glue is intended only to hold the 
pedestals during installation, not to secure them for the long term. It is thought that concrete 
surface dust and other defects result in low shear capacity. Mechanical anchors are 
preferable. All raised access floors appeared to have stringers connecting pedestals—a 
desirable feature. The room contains three computer consoles and a display board. We were 
told that one of the consoles provides a backup for either of the other two. The consoles 
appeared to have no positive restraint against sliding (Figure 3-4), meaning that in strong 
shaking they could slide or overturn. This is a potential weak link at this facility.  
Some of the computer monitors and system units (the boxes that house the disk drives, 
system board, central processing unit, etc.) in the consoles were observed to be restrained 
against sliding, and some appeared to be unrestrained (Figure 3-5). Lack of restraint tends to 
increase the probability that the component will slide, overturn, and possibly cease to operate 
in the event of an earthquake. Unrestrained computers and monitors could be a weak link at 
this facility. The large display board contains a number of liquid crystal displays, which 
appeared to be well secured to a Unistrut steel frame, itself apparently anchored to the floor 
and wall (Figure 3-6).  
   
pict0174, pict0151, pict0152 
Figure 3-3. Grid control room and pedestals supporting its 3-in raised access floor 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
2 Exceptions exist, especially structural changes made to accommodate architectural or equipment features. A 
classic example is a crucial brace cut to accommodate a door. We did not observe any such obvious defects, 
although some may exist. 
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pict0167, pict0168 
Figure 3-4. Grid control room consoles appeared to lack seismic restraint 
 
   
pict0172, pict0171, pict0169 
Figure 3-5. Some but not all computer equipment in grid control room appeared to be restrained 
 
   
img_0248,pict0157, pict0153 
Figure 3-6. Grid display board (left), and its restraint at bottom (center photo) and top (right) 
 
The overhead suspended ceiling system appeared to lack compression struts, although 
splay-brace wires were present (Figure 3-7). (Compression struts are rigid rods extending 
vertically from the ceiling framing members to the floor slab above, and are required by 
building codes for seismic resistance; the wires alone are considered inadequate to prevent 
ceiling collapse.) In practice, if the ceiling extends to the walls of the room, the walls tend to 
restrain (or “capture”) the ceiling more effectively than compression struts and splay braces, 
but the ceiling in this room does not extend to all the adjacent walls, and instead slopes up to 
the ceiling on the side of the room where one enters (i.e., opposite the display boards). Light 
fixtures near the point of observation had safety wires, used to inhibit the fixtures from 
falling if the ceiling collapses (Figure 3-8).  
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[pict0160, pict0159] 
Figure 3-7. Suspended ceilings in grid control room.  
 
  
[pict0161, pict0163] 
Figure 3-8. Safety wires observed on light fixtures in grid control room ceiling 
 
Main computer room. Equipment in this room stands on a raised access floor on 12-in 
pedestals, the pedestals appeared to be fixed to the floor slab with mastic and mechanical 
anchors, and to have stringers positively attached to the pedestal heads, but to lack diagonal 
bracing (Figure 3-9). The computers comprise what was described to Caltech as a next-
generation energy control system. Computer system units and monitors were secured to racks 
with fabric straps and the racks secured to the concrete floor slab by a system of diagonal 
metal rods, turnbuckles, and bolts anchored to the slab (Figure 3-10). The bracing for the 
racks was probably not designed to brace the raised access floors against excessive lateral 
displacement; it is unclear whether it would do so in practice. The lack of bracing for the 
raised access floors could be a weak link at this facility.  
Main computers are largely redundant, meaning that any of two or more computers can 
perform the same function, if one is damaged. The suspended ceiling system was observed to 
have compression struts and diagonal splay braces every 6 to 12 ft, and the ceiling appeared 
to be captured on all four sides by walls. Some light fixtures in the main computer room 
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appeared to lack safety wires secured to the slab above (Figure 3-11). This is primarily a life 
safety hazard, although in the 1983 Coalinga earthquake, falling light fixtures caused damage 
to equipment below (EQE Inc., 1986). The room is protected by a Halon system for fire 
suppression, and the Halon tank is secured to the wall (Figure 3-12).  
  
[pict0178, pict0179] 
Figure 3-9. Anchorage of pedestals in main computer room raised access floor 
 
  
[pict0184, pict0176, pict0177] 
Figure 3-10. Restraint of computer equipment in main computer room 
 
 
[pict0183] 
Figure 3-11. Some light fixtures in the main computer room appeared to lack safety wires 
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[pict0186] 
Figure 3-12. Halon tank in main computer room appeared to be secured to the wall 
 
Standby emergency generator. A 800 kW Saturn Solar generator is installed at the 
facility, which we were told is of powering the entire GCF. It is supplied from a 2000-gallon 
tank outside the building (Figure 3-13), which is anchored to the slab, and capable of 
supplying the generator with 50 hr of fuel at 40 gal/hr. However, the fuel is delivered to the 
generator via a combined day tank and fuel pump (Figure 3-14). The fuel pump and day tank 
are not secured to the floor, which substantially increases the probability that in a strong 
earthquake they would slide and break the attached piping, itself secured to the wall, 
rendering the generator inoperative and possibly spilling diesel fuel (Figure 3-15). The 
generator requires batteries to power its starter motor. Although the battery rack is secured to 
the floor, the batteries lack spacers to prevent them from sliding within the rack (Figure 
3-16), which increases the probability that movement of the batteries would break the 
conductors between individual cells, which would prevent the batteries from powering the 
starter motor, and prevent from the generator from starting. The generator is tested monthly, 
a desirable feature that mitigates the probability of operator failure or undetected equipment 
damage. However, the day tank’s lack of anchorage and the battery rack’s lack of spacers 
appear to be important weak links in the GCF’s provision for on-site electric power in the 
event of the loss of off-site power.  
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[img_0273] [pict0192] 
Figure 3-13. GCF emergency generator (left) and its fuel tank (right) 
 
 
[pict0189] 
Figure 3-14. GCF combined generator day tank and fuel pump, apparently not anchored to the slab 
 
  
[pict0190 pict0194] 
Figure 3-15. Piping attached to GCF generator day tank 
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[pict0191 img_0276] 
Figure 3-16. Battery rack for GCF generator starter motor was anchored but batteries lacked spacers 
 
Other electrical equipment in electrical building. Uninterruptible power supply (UPS) 
equipment and other electrical equipment are housed in a small structure adjacent to the main 
building. The UPS battery racks are well anchored to the floor slab, have longitudinal 
diagonal braces and batteries are restrained from falling off the rack and supplied with 
spacers between batteries, all desirable features (Figure 3-17). Cabinets holding the transfer 
switches, as well as all other controls, breakers, and transformers whose anchorage was 
examined, appeared to be anchored to the floor slab (Figure 3-18). While overhead cable 
trays in at least one portion lacks lateral restraint, the run is braced in each direction by an 
abutting wall (Figure 3-19). There are some pendant lights in this room of a type that have 
collapsed in past earthquakes, but again, this mostly life-safety concern is mitigated by the 
fact that the room is not normally occupied (Figure 3-19). A radio tower on the top of this 
electrical building was not examined for seismic resistance (Figure 3-20).  
   
[img_0280] [pict0196] [pict0195] 
Figure 3-17. GCF battery racks 
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[img_0282, img_0279] 
Figure 3-18. Electrical cabinets appeared to be anchored to floor slab 
 
  
[pict0200] [img_0270] 
Figure 3-19. Cable trays and lights in GCF electrical equipment room 
 
 
[img_0267] 
Figure 3-20. Radio tower at GCF 
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3.2.2 Observations of equipment at data processing facility  
This facility was visited on June 30, 2006. It serves data processing needs for the utility, 
including accounting, procurement, billing, and other crucial data processing functions. See 
Appendix B for the fault tree of this facility. 
Telephone switching equipment. Telephone switching equipment in the 
telecommunications room appeared to be anchored at the base although without apparent 
bracing at the top (Figure 3-21). Cable trays lacked sway bracing, but were generally not in 
long straight runs, and did not appear to be particularly heavily loaded or capable of falling 
off their supports (Figure 3-22).  
   
[pict0207] [pict0209] [pict0210] 
Figure 3-21. Anchorage of DPF telephone switching equipment 
 
 
[pict0211] 
Figure 3-22. A DPF cable tray in a telephone switch room 
 
Information Technology Operations Center (ITOC). Computer equipment in this room is 
mounted in long consoles, largely without straps or other means of preventing sliding or 
overturning of the system units or monitors (Figure 3-23). There appears to be no restraint of 
the consoles themselves to prevent sliding or overturning. Other furnishings in the room such 
as tall filing cabinets lack seismic restraint (Figure 3-24). Raised access floor in this room is 
on heavy 2-ft pedestals, but each pedestal appeared to be secured to the slab below by two 
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rather than four bolts, and does not appear to be braced, although nearby flooring in the 
adjacent ITOC equipment room is braced (Figure 3-25). We were informed that raised access 
flooring in this facility is in a multi-year process of seismic strengthening. Heavy equipment 
in the ITOC equipment room are provided with supplemental steel framing underneath the 
floor to prevent overturning, while lighter pieces of equipment are anchored to the slab 
beneath the raised access floor by vertical steel rods anchored into the slab below (Figure 
3-26). Although the supplemental steel framing is intended to brace the equipment, not the 
floor, it might act to prevent excessive lateral motion of the floor. The vertical steel rods, if 
securely installed, would inhibit overturning of the equipment so long as the raised access 
floor did not displace or collapse. The lack of restraint for computers and consoles in the 
ITOC room, as well as the lack of bracing of the raised access floor, may represent weak 
links at this facility.  
   
[pict0215, pict0220, pict0218] 
Figure 3-23. Consoles containing apparently unrestrained computer system units and monitors 
 
  
[pict0216, pict0217] 
Figure 3-24. Apparently unrestrained tall furnishings in DPF ITOC room 
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[img_0305] [img_0316] 
Figure 3-25. Raised access floor appears to be unbraced in ITOC room (left), although bracing is present 
in the ITOC equipment room (right).  
 
  
[img_0317] [img_0321] 
Figure 3-26. Red members behind the floor pedestal are steel framing to support heavy equipment in 
ITOC equipment room (left); lighter equipment secured with vertical rods (right).  
 
CPU rooms 1 and 2. Suspended ceilings examined here lack compression struts, and it 
was unclear whether light fixtures in the ceiling had secure, independent safety wires, which 
if absent would indicate a higher probability that light fixtures could fall, threatening life 
safety and endangering computer equipment. Computer equipment cabinets here are tethered 
at four corners to the slab below by various systems: slack steel cable with turnbuckles for 
tension adjustment, anchored to Unistrut members bolted to the slab below and secured by 
various means to the cabinet above (Figure 3-27); or by steel frames (Figure 3-28). Raised 
access floors in CPU room 2 are braced on one side of the room (Figure 3-29), although not 
on the other. Computer cabinets are all secured to the slab below by similar means as in CPU 
room 1, i.e., tethers or rigid frames, although it appears that the rigid frames in some cases 
rely on relatively long unbraced lengths of bolt (Figure 3-30).  
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[pict0236, img_0344, pict0241] 
Figure 3-27. System of tethering equipment in CPU rooms 1 and 2 
 
  
[pict0234, img_0337] 
Figure 3-28. Steel frames used for some equipment in CPU rooms 1 and 2 
 
 
[img_0350] 
Figure 3-29. Bracing on raised access flooring in part of CPU room 2 
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[img_0363] 
Figure 3-30. Seismic restraint of equipment in CPU room 2 
 
Tape library. This room houses five cylindrical tape silos3, as well as some smaller units 
that perform the same function (Figure 3-31). The tape silos are not secured to the floor, 
resting on leveling devices (Figure 3-32); in strong shaking, conduit attached to the tape silos 
from above (we were told these were for Halon supply; see the pipe above the cylindrical 
tape silo on Figure 3-31) would provide limited restraint, although these conduits are 
probably not intended to serve such a purpose. The raised access floors themselves lack 
diagonal bracing, and stand on slender pedestals secured to the slab with two shot anchors per 
pedestal (Figure 3-33). Halon tanks in this room are secured to the wall, and Halon pipes 
appeared to be at least partially braced (Figure 3-34). The lack of seismic restraint for the 
raised access floors and tape silos may represent a weak link at this facility.  
  
[pict0252] [pict0255] 
Figure 3-31. Tape silos at DPF 
 
                                                 
3 “Tape silo” is a misnomer; these devices handle hard disk drives.  
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[img_0391] 
Figure 3-32. Levelers under DPF tape silo 
 
  
[pict0247] [pict0248] 
Figure 3-33. Raised access flooring in DPF tape silo room 
 
  
[pict0260] [img_0407] 
Figure 3-34. Halon tanks and pipe in DPF tape silo room 
 
Printer room. The printer room contains two large laser printers, which we were told are 
used to print reports and checks. The printers lack seismic restraint, which increases the 
probability that they would roll, slide, impact, or overturn in an earthquake, and become 
inoperative (Figure 3-35). Document insertion equipment (used for example to put checks in 
envelopes) were not present in this facility. This equipment stands on 2-ft raised access 
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flooring without diagonal bracing and limited anchorage to the slab below (two anchors per 
pedestal, as opposed to four; Figure 3-36). The lack of seismic restraint for the raised access 
floors and printers seems to represent another weak link at this facility. 
  
[pict0262] [img_0413] 
Figure 3-35. DPF printer room equipment 
 
 
img_0411 
Figure 3-36. Apparently unbraced raised access floor in DPF printer room 
 
UPS equipment. The uninterruptible power supply (UPS) system, comprising two banks 
of two redundant systems (5 and 6, 7 and 8; Figure 3-37) appear to be anchored to the slab 
although not braced at the top (Figure 3-38); batteries appeared to be generally, but not 
always, secured on their racks, as shown in Figure 3-37. The cabinets that house the 
rectifiers, inverters, and other electric equipment needed to convert between outside power 
and UPS power appeared to be anchored to the slab (Figure 3-39). The electrical conduit 
between the batteries and these cabinets were supported on hangers that appeared to be 
braced to the wall (Figure 3-40). 
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pict0268, img_0426 
Figure 3-37. DPF battery racks 
 
  
img_0429 pict0270 
Figure 3-38. Apparent anchorage at base (left) but not at top (right) of DPF battery-rack cabinets 
 
  
pict0273, pict0274 
Figure 3-39. UPS cabinets appeared to be anchored 
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img_0427 
Figure 3-40. UPS electrical conduit hangers in DPF apparently braced to the wall 
 
Penthouse. It was unclear whether switchgear in the penthouse was anchored to the floor 
slab. The equipment cabinets were closed and building engineers accompanying us did not 
want to open them without the supervision of electricians. We assume these cabinets are well 
anchored, since virtually all other critical equipment in the facility is well anchored.  
Breaker battery racks. We observed battery racks that building engineers suspected serve 
circuit breakers, as opposed to the main UPS (Figure 3-41). These racks have battery 
restraints and longitudinal braces but lack spacers between the batteries. Spacers (often 
Styrofoam sheets placed between batteries) are an attempt to prevent the batteries from 
shifting within their frame and breaking the conductors between adjacent batteries. The lack 
of spacers increases the probability that an earthquake would damage the conductors and 
prevent the battery rack from supplying power; this shortcoming may be a weak link at this 
facility.  
  
img_0442, img_0444 
Figure 3-41. Battery racks serving breakers 
 
Second –floor mechanical room. Four redundant air handling units (AHUs) in this room 
represent an important exception to the seismic anchorage of equipment in this facility. They 
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are on vibration isolators without seismic snubbers (Figure 3-42). (Seismic snubbers are 
metal fixtures attached to the slab next to a vibration-isolated mechanical device to restrain 
the device’s lateral movement; an example is shown in Figure 3-43). The AHUs are rigidly 
attached to piping that could be damaged by excessive displacement of the AHU in an 
earthquake (Figure 3-44), which is another issue that tends to raise the probability of 
operational failure. Note that two of the four AHUs are needed. Lack of seismic restraint for 
these AHUs is a potential weak link at this facility.  
  
[pict0281, pict0282] 
Figure 3-42. Air handling units in DPF on isolators apparently without seismic snubbers 
 
 
[FEMA-74-detail-U32.bmp] 
Figure 3-43. Schematic drawing of a seismic snubber, from FEMA (1994) 
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[img_0455] 
Figure 3-44. Piping rigidly attached to an air handling unit in DPF 
 
Emergency generator. A diesel generator is located outside the building within an 
unroofed enclosure. The generator has a belly tank and a 10,000 main fuel tank capable of 
supplying the facility with electric power for 4 to 8 days. The generator, its fuel tank, and 
switchgear appear to be well anchored (Figure 3-45, Figure 3-46, Figure 3-47). Other nearby 
switchgear and transformers (Figure 3-48) appeared to be anchored to the slab.  
  
pict0284, pict0285  
Figure 3-45. DPF generator and its seismic restraint 
 
  
pict0286, pict0287 
Figure 3-46. DPF generator's fuel tank and its seismic restraint 
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img_0475 
Figure 3-47. Seismic restraint of DPF generator's switchgear 
 
  
pict0292, pict0293 
Figure 3-48. Anchorage of electrical equipment near DPF generator 
 
Cooling towers at DPF appeared to be seismically anchored. DPF does not have an on-
site water supply, and it is of concern that if the local water supply is interrupted in an 
earthquake, evaporation of the water in the cooling towers could render the air conditioning 
at this facility inoperative; this may be a weak link at this facility, which could be remediated 
by providing a backup water supply for the cooling towers.  
  
pict0288, pict0290 
Figure 3-49. Cooling towers at DPF and their anchorage. This facility lacks an on-site backup water 
supply in case the local water utility is damaged. 
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3.2.3 Observations of backup data facility equipment  
This facility was visited on July 5, 2006. It serves as a backup site for the grid control and 
other data processing functions of both the grid control facility and data processing facility. 
See Appendix C for the fault tree of this facility. 
Alternative grid control center. This room rests on 2-ft raised access flooring. It contains 
a number of 5-ft-high cubicles with desktop computers suspended beneath the desk and 
monitors secured to the tops of the desks. The cubicles are not mechanically restrained from 
sliding or overturning. If they were to slide or overturn, the electrical cords powering the 
computers could pull out of their sockets, rendering the affected AGCF computer equipment 
inoperative. Overhead is a suspended ceiling system with automatic sprinklers.  
Second-floor utility space. The facility has three backup diesel generators (A, B, and C,), 
of which only one is needed to power the facility in the event of the loss of off-site power. 
The generators are all anchored to the floor slab with isolators that appear capable of 
providing substantial seismic resistance against uplift and lateral displacement (Figure 3-50). 
The day tanks and integral electric fuel pumps are secured to the slab as well (Figure 3-51). 
The batteries need to power the starter motors are not anchored to the slab, and lack battery 
spacers (Figure 3-52). They could slide off the plinth and possibly break their connection to 
the generator in the event of strong shaking, hindering the timely operation of backup 
generators. The lack of anchorage of starter-motor batteries and their lack of spacers may 
represent a weak link at the BDF facility.  
  
img_0507 img_0511 
Figure 3-50. Generators and their seismic isolators at BDF 
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cimg0019 
Figure 3-51. BDF generator day tank and electric fuel pump, apparently anchored to the slab 
 
  
cimg0018, img_0512 
Figure 3-52. Apparently unanchored starter-motor batteries for generators at BDF 
 
Each generator has a 50-gal day tank and we were told burns approximately 110 gal/hr. A 
20,000 gal fuel tank outside the building and anchored to its plinth (Figure 3-53) therefore 
provides up to 180 hr (8 days) of fuel. The fuel pump is inside the tank. We observed that the 
supply pipe that runs between the tank and the generators is secured along about 125 ft to a 
heavy concrete fence comprising seven panels with no connection between them (Figure 
3-54). Differential displacement of the tops of these panels could conceivably rupture the 
supply pipe, both disrupting on-site power generation and causing a hazardous material spill. 
In that event the generator could possibly be supplied by manually filling 55-gallon drums 
(one was observed next to the tank) and hauling them up to the generator day tanks. An 
alternative approach would be to provide a shutoff valve on the pipe run from the tank and an 
alternative point for injecting fuel into the supply pipe from a tanker parked at the loading 
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dock, where the pipe enters the building (Figure 3-55). Failure of the diesel supply pipe along 
this fence may represent an important weak link at this facility.  
  
img_0703 img_0706 
Figure 3-53. Diesel fuel tank at BDF apparently anchored to its plinth 
 
  
cimg0134, cimg0133 
Figure 3-54. Fuel line secured to a long segment of concrete fence at BDF 
 
 
img_0713 
Figure 3-55. Possible access point on the loading dock for alternative method of fueling diesel generators 
in case the fuel pipe breaks on the concrete fence 
 
Near the generators is synchronizing gear, which ensures identical phase and voltage 
from the generators. The gear appears to be anchored to the slab. On the roof above, each 
generator has a radiator whose anchorage was not visible (Figure 3-56), muffler that appeared 
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to lack positive seismic restraint (Figure 3-57) and an enclosure containing air intake fan with 
equipment to cool the outside air before it is fed into the generator (Figure 3-58). The intake 
fan motor had vibration isolators with questionable resistance to lateral displacement. The 
lack of seismic restraint for the mufflers is presumably not a critical issue, as long as local 
authorities would allow the generators to be run despite damage to the mufflers. Damage to 
the air intake fans could conceivably prevent the generators from operating, so the light 
vibration isolators might be more of a reliability issue.  
  
cimg0042, img_0545 
Figure 3-56. Radiator for BDF emergency generator 
 
 
img_0543 
Figure 3-57. Muffler for BDF emergency generator 
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img_0547 cimg0044 img_0552 
Figure 3-58. Enclosure with generator air supply fan and pre-cooling equipment. Isolator appears to have 
questionable seismic restraint 
 
Cooling towers. There are two 1000-ton cooling towers at the facility with isolators that 
provide resistance to uplift and lateral displacement (Figure 3-59). There are two 30,000-gal 
water storage basins, each with three redundant pumps anchored to the floor (Figure 3-60). 
The cooling towers lose up to 500 gal/hr to evaporation, so if off-site water supply were lost, 
the basins could supply at least 60 hr of water for cooling. The basins can be refilled from 
trucks outside the facility.  
  
cimg0026 img_0523 
Figure 3-59. BDF cooling towers and their anchorage 
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cimg0122, cimg0123 
Figure 3-60. On-site water supply at BDF for use by cooling towers 
 
Second-floor central plant. There are three redundant chillers, all with seismic anchorage 
(Figure 3-61). Compressors appeared to be seismically restrained (Figure 3-62). Hot air 
heating is electric, with two redundant and anchored 480V boilers (Figure 3-63), although air 
is heated solely for comfort and the boilers are therefore not critical equipment. Ventilation 
fans in this area were observed to be mounted on isolators that lack seismic restraint (Figure 
3-64); building engineers informed us these are used for the warm-air system, and are 
therefore not critical to continued operations.  
  
img_0557 cimg0047 
Figure 3-61. Chillers and their seismic anchorage in BDF 
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cimg0049 
Figure 3-62. Compressors in BDF appeared to be seismically restrained 
 
  
cimg0056, cimg0057 
Figure 3-63. BDF electric boilers, apparently seismically anchored 
 
  
cimg0054 cimg0055 
Figure 3-64. Fans in BDF for warm air, without apparent seismic restraint 
 
Building control center. All building service equipment (mechanical, electrical, and 
plumbing) is controlled with direct digital control (DDC) from this second-floor room. Desks 
in this room are tethered to the slab beneath the raised access floor (Figure 3-65). The 
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monitors are not secured and at least some system units were in unrestrained cabinets (Figure 
3-66). Suspended ceilings in this room appeared to have compression struts and diagonal 
splay wires, but not in the same places as would be required for modern construction (Figure 
3-67). The ceiling is captured all the way around by walls, which tend to be more remediate 
this problem. However, ductwork and automatic sprinkler lines appeared largely to lack 
lateral restraint that would help to mitigate the potential for seismic damage (Figure 3-68). 
An equipment closet in this room contains approximately 20 non-redundant DDC panels 
fastened to the wall (Figure 3-69). Of some concern is the fact that this closet has automatic 
sprinklers rather than Halon. If the sprinkler pipe were damaged or water were otherwise 
discharged, it could conceivably damage all these panels. Although building engineers 
informed us that all the building service equipment can be run manually, the ceiling system in 
the control center, the sprinklers in this equipment closet, and the lack of seismic restraint for 
the computers in this room may represent important weak links at this facility.  
  
cimg0059 img_0595 
Figure 3-65. Desks in BDF building control room appeared to be tethered to the slab 
  
cimg0060 img_0584 
Figure 3-66. Some computer equipment in BDF building control room lack seismic restraint 
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cimg0067 cimg0070 
Figure 3-67. Compression struts and diagonal splay wires in BDF building control room ceiling 
 
 
cimg0066 
Figure 3-68. Ductwork and automatic sprinkler lines in BDF building control room appeared largely to 
lack lateral restraint.  
 
 
img_0591 
Figure 3-69. DDC console cabinet of the BDF building control room 
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Second-floor utility space. There are four redundant air handling units common to the 
primary spaces and an additional air handling unit for the printer room, all anchored to their 
plinths (Figure 3-70).  
  
cimg0072, cimg0073 
Figure 3-70. Air handling units in BDF appeared to be anchored to their plinths 
 
UPS equipment. We observed four battery modules, with three cabinets per module, all 
apparently anchored to the slab (Figure 3-71). Batteries for the most part appeared to be 
secured to their racks (Figure 3-72). We did not observe whether the batteries have spacers, 
but as the image shows, conductors between batteries appeared to be flexible cable and thus 
less subject to fracture in case the batteries pound into each other inside the cabinet. We 
observed a (non-critical) battery charging rack without apparent anchorage (Figure 3-73). 
Two redundant systems of two uninterruptible power modules per system (rectifier, inverter, 
etc.) appeared to be anchored to the slab (Figure 3-74). Air conditioning equipment near the 
UPS systems appeared to be anchored to the slab (Figure 3-75).  
  
cimg0074, cimg0077 
Figure 3-71. UPS equipment apparently anchored to slab 
 
 Analysis of Simultaneous Operational Failure of Critical Facilities due to Earthquake, for a California Utility 
 44 
 
img_0618 
Figure 3-72. UPS batteries at BDF 
 
  
img_0619 cimg0081 
Figure 3-73. Non-critical battery charging rack at BDF without apparent anchorage to the floor 
 
  
cimg0085, cimg0087 
Figure 3-74. UPS equipment at BDF apparently anchored to the floor slab 
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cimg0089 
Figure 3-75. Air conditioning equipment near BDF UPS cabinets, apparently anchored to the slab 
 
Overhead electrical ducts were observed to be supported on braced hangers (Figure 3-76). 
However, the fire suppression system in the 2nd floor mechanical spaces is provided by 
automatic sprinklers (charged, wet lines), with long unbraced runs of pipe in excess of 20 ft. 
In several spaces these pipes were observed to be located near unbraced ductwork (Figure 
3-77) that in an earthquake could interact with and possibly break the sprinkler pipe, which 
could lead to water spraying on UPS and other electrical equipment. This appeared to be a 
common situation throughout the building: braced electric conduit hangers and cable trays, 
but unbraced automatic sprinkler lines and air-conditioning ducts. The potential for 
earthquake sprinkler leakage caused by damage to sprinkler pipe may be an important weak 
link at this facility, especially in areas with electrical equipment. Damage to air ducts 
aggravated by lack of bracing could also pose a serious problem for air conditioning in 
computer spaces.  
  
cimg0091, cimg0092 
Figure 3-76. Overhead electrical ducts and hanger braces at BDF 
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cimg0098 cimg0099 
Figure 3-77. Long unbraced sprinkler lines and places where they could interact with ductwork 
 
Switchgear room. We observed two long panels of switchgear, all apparently anchored to 
the concrete plinth (Figure 3-78), and two racks of batteries to power these, also anchored to 
the slab and having longitudinal bracing and no need for battery spacers (Figure 3-79).  
  
img_0647, cimg0102 
Figure 3-78. BDF switchgear and its anchorage 
 
  
img_0649, cimg0105 
Figure 3-79. Battery racks, apparently well anchored, with restrained batteries and longitudinal braces 
 
Telecommunications room. This room houses telecommunications equipment belonging 
to the facility’s owner (as opposed to the local telephone service provider). The 
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telecommunication equipment appeared to be secured to the floor slab (Figure 3-80). 
Overhead cable trays appeared to be braced to the wall (Figure 3-81). The room is protected 
by automatic sprinklers as well as a Halon system, although building engineers informed us 
that the Halon system should suppress any fire and prevent the fusible links on the automatic 
sprinklers from melting and causing water to discharge, although as elsewhere long unbraced 
runs of pipe (Figure 3-82) raise increase the probability of earthquake sprinkler leakage. The 
Halon tank appeared to be secured to the wall (Figure 3-83). The telecommunications 
switching equipment has its own battery rack, anchored to the slab, with longitudinal braces 
and battery restraints and spacers, all desirable features for seismic resistance (Figure 3-84).  
  
cimg0109, cimg0111 
Figure 3-80. Telecommunications equipment at BDF and its anchorage  
 
 
cimg0115 
Figure 3-81. Overhead cable trays in BDF telecommunications room appeared to be braced to the wall 
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img_0662 
Figure 3-82. Long unbraced runs of sprinkler pipe in BDF telecommunications room 
 
 
cimg0116 
Figure 3-83. Halon tank in BDF telecommunications room, apparently strapped to the wall 
 
  
cimg0118, cimg0121 
Figure 3-84. Battery rack for telecommunications equipment 
 
Transformer vault. Outside the facility were four transformers that we were told step 
down power from the 16000 kV train from the nearby substation to 480V. There are two 
transformers per each of two trains. The vaults were not directly accessible at the time of our 
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visit, but equipment near a vantage point appeared to be restrained from sliding (Figure 
3-85).  
  
img_0720, cimg0139 
Figure 3-85. Transformer vault at BDF, and apparent seismic restraint of its equipment  
 
CPU room. This large room stands on 2-ft raised access flooring. The pedestals within 
sight of our vantage point lack diagonal bracing, and were anchored at four corners with 
epoxy anchors (Figure 3-86). Equipment in this room is restrained by various systems, for 
example, bolted to IBM anti-tip plates in front and an innovative angle bracket to a rear 
wheel axle. These are then secured to a steel cable tether, with turnbuckle to adjust for 
tautness, itself secured to a Unistrut member secured to the slab below (Figure 3-87). We 
were told that all equipment in this room weighing in excess of 400 lb is tethered in this 
fashion. Lighter equipment is secured against overturning by threaded rods secured to the 
levelers and anchored to the slab below, as at DPF. It is conceivable that the tethers on the 
larger equipment could act to restrain the raised access floor in the absence of diagonal 
braces, but because the tethers are not taut, and are not designed to restrain the floor, the 
raised access flooring is more likely to collapse than if diagonal braces were present. 
Unbraced raised access flooring could be an important weak link at this facility.  
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cimg0153 
Figure 3-86. Raised access floors at BDF CPU room, apparently lacking braces 
 
  
  
cimg0147, cimg0157, cimg0148, cimg0149 
Figure 3-87. System of tethering computer equipment to slab below raised access floor in BDF CPU room 
 
The ceiling in the CPU room was observed to have compression struts and splay wires, 
and the light fixtures near our point of inspection had safety wires (Figure 3-88). At least 
some ductwork within view of this point also appeared to be braced, but long unbraced runs 
of sprinkler pipe were also visible (Figure 3-89). 
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cimg0184, cimg0185 
Figure 3-88. Ceiling in the BDF CPU room with compression struts, splay wires, and safety wires on light 
fixtures  
 
  
(cimg0181) (cimg0186) 
Figure 3-89. Ductwork and sprinkler pipe at BDF CPU room 
 
Helpdesk room. This room stands on 2-ft raised access flooring. Cubicles appeared to 
lack seismic restraint. Each cubicle had one or more desktop computers on the floor or the 
desk, with one or more CRT or LCD monitors, none of which appeared to be secured (Figure 
3-90). Sliding or overturning of cubicles and computer equipment, and possible damage or 
pullout of electrical connections, are all more likely because of the lack of seismic restraint. 
Vulnerability of the helpdesk facility may represent an important weak link.  
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img_0792, cimg0190 
Figure 3-90. BDF helpdesk center and apparently unsecured computer equipment 
 
Tape silo room. Similar to the data processing facility, four cylindrical tape silos in the 
backup data facility rest on 12-in raised access floor. While some controllers appeared to be 
seismically restrained (Figure 3-91), the cylindrical silos themselves are not, and are 
therefore more likely to slide, pound against each other, and possibly become inoperative in 
an earthquake (Figure 3-92). This may be an important weak link at this facility.  
 
img_0800 
Figure 3-91. Seismic restraint of controllers in BDF tape silo room 
 
  
img_0797, img_0799 
Figure 3-92. Apparently unrestrained BDF tape silos 
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Print room and document handling equipment. The print and distribution area stands on 
1-ft raised access flooring. Equipment in this room is tethered to the floor panels (Figure 
3-93); we do not know whether the bolts connected to the floor panel are themselves 
restrained to the slab below using a tethering system such as described above. Document 
insertion equipment in the warehouse (the alternate mailing operation center; no raised access 
floor) appears to be secured to the slab (Figure 3-94). Long unbraced lengths of sprinkler 
pipes and or minimally braced copper air lines were observed suspended from the deck above 
(Figure 3-95). Compressed air tanks and compressors (compressed air being needed by the 
document handling equipment) appeared to be anchored to the floor slab (Figure 3-96).  
  
cimg0194, cimg0193 
Figure 3-93. Document handling equipment in BDF restrained to raised access floor 
 
  
cimg0196, cimg0199 
Figure 3-94. Restraint of document handling equipment in BDF 
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cimg0200 
Figure 3-95. Long unbraced lengths of sprinkler pipe and minimally braced copper air pipe in BDF 
 
  
cimg0201, cimg0202 
Figure 3-96. Anchorage of air tanks and compressor assemblies in BDF 
 
3.3 OTHER DATA COLLECTION 
3.3.1 Off-site utility failure 
We reviewed available literature to estimate the failure probability of off-site utility 
services, most notably domestic water (most relevant to the continued operation of cooling 
towers) and offsite electric power.  
3.3.2 Fragility of unusual equipment  
Approximately cylindrical tape silos are present at DPF and BDF. These devices are 
approximately 5 ft in diameter, 6 ft tall, and hold between 500 and 1,000 data cartridges. The 
specimens observed rest on metal levelers on smooth raised access flooring, without positive 
seismic restraint, although Halon conduits enter the device from above, and might provide a 
stiff but perhaps brittle point of restraint. No seismic fragility information was readily 
available about these devices. They do not appear in Johnson et al.’s (1999) manual, and no 
evidence of them appears in an important database of past nonstructural damage (Kao et al. 
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1999). The devices may be relatively rare (especially in comparison with switchgear, cooling 
towers, etc.) or have not yet been observed to experience damage in earthquakes (also 
reasonable in that they fairly new). We therefore formulated fragility functions for them.  
3.4 STRUCTURAL VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS  
3.4.1 Methodology 
Combination of two national standards. There is no single standard methodology to 
relate the earthquake shaking intensity a building experiences to the likelihood that a building 
safety inspector will subsequently post the building unsafe to enter or occupy. To develop 
such a relationship, one can perform a two-step procedure: use a standard engineering 
methodology to relate shaking intensity to the degree of a building’s structural damage (here, 
either FEMA-356 or HAZUS), and then apply another standard (ATC-20) to relate damage to 
the outcome of the safety inspection. Such a procedure is easier to understand by considering 
the second step first.  
ATC-20 Safety Evaluation. ATC-20 (Applied Technology Council 1996) represents the 
standard methodology for post-earthquake safety evaluation of buildings, in which inspectors 
examining a building after an earthquake estimate the building’s seismic safety and 
determine whether the building is safe to enter or occupy. The portion of ATC-20 that is 
relevant here is the conditions under which the procedure calls for a building safety inspector 
to post a building as unsafe (i.e., to red tag the building). The document requires that the 
inspector investigate the building for each of several conditions:  
• Collapse, partial collapse, or building off foundation 
• Building or story leaning 
• Racking damage to walls, other structural damage 
• Chimney, parapet, or other falling hazard 
• Ground slope movement or cracking 
The inspector can judge each condition to be in any of three degrees: minor or none; 
moderate, or severe, with the judgment of what constitutes each degree left to the inspector. 
The inspector is instructed that “Severe conditions endangering the overall building are 
grounds for an Unsafe posting. Localized Severe and overall Moderate conditions may allow 
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a Restricted Use [yellow tag] posting.” [Emphasis added.] Otherwise the building is posted 
“inspected,” (green tag), meaning that inspector has placed no restriction on the building’s 
use or occupancy.  
Note that ATC-20 begins with an observation of damage, and does not include structural 
analysis or consider the shaking intensity that the building experienced, those issues being 
largely irrelevant once the damage has occurred. Hence the need for an analytical 
methodology to estimate the damage before the earthquake has occurred. Two such 
methodologies exist that can be considered national standards: FEMA 356 (published by the 
American Society of Civil Engineers in 2000), and HAZUS (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency and the National Institute of Building Sciences 2003). The former 
applies to individual buildings and includes a detailed structural analysis and assignment of a 
“seismic performance level.” The latter is more generic, intended for estimating the seismic 
performance of large numbers of buildings where detailed structural analysis is impractical.  
We have used both methodologies: FEMA 356 for the data processing facility and 
backup data facility (the facilities for which we were able to perform detailed structural 
analyses), and HAZUS for the grid control facility. 
FEMA 356 for Building-Specific Structural Damage Analysis. The FEMA 356 
methodology was developed for assessing seismic rehabilitation measures for existing 
buildings. The relevant portion of the methodology is its procedures for creating a 
mathematical model of an existing building or proposed retrofit, performing a structural 
analysis, and estimating the structural damage to the building. A product of the analysis is the 
estimated damage to each structural component, assessed in terms of whether the component 
meets acceptance criteria for three seismic performance levels: immediate occupancy, life 
safety, and collapse prevention.  
The FEMA 356 and ATC-20 criteria are defined somewhat qualitatively, and do not use 
the same terminology, so there is no definitive way to mesh FEMA 356 and ATC-20, no 
authoritative relationship between FEMA-356 acceptance criteria and ATC-20 tag color. 
However, a reasonable interpretation of FEMA 356 and ATC-20 is that a building with 
“Localized Severe and overall Moderate” damage might refer to a building with up to 5% or 
so structural elements failing the FEMA 356 life-safety acceptance criteria, and that “Severe 
conditions endangering the overall building” could reasonably refer to a building with 
between 5% and 15% of its structural elements failing the FEMA 356 life-safety acceptance 
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criteria. We therefore judgmentally the relationship between the fraction of structural 
components failing the FEMA-356 life-safety criteria and the probability of being red-tagged 
as shown in Figure 3-97.  
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Figure 3-97. Relating FEMA-356 structural-damage assessment and ATC-20 safety evaluation 
 
HAZUS for Generic Structural Damage Analysis. The HAZUS methodology represents 
a national standard in the estimation of the future seismic performance of generic buildings. 
It is applied here to the grid control facility, which is treated as a generic lowrise reinforced 
concrete shearwall building designed to moderate seismic code requirements. The portion of 
the HAZUS methodology that is relevant here for estimating the probability of red-tagging is 
the procedure for estimating the damage state of the building’s structural components. By 
“damage state” is meant one of six qualitative degrees of damage: none, slight, moderate, 
extensive, complete, and collapse. A building in the “complete” or “collapse” damage state 
can be certainly associated with a red tag.  
Would a building in HAZUS’ extensive structural damage state be red tagged? The 
HAZUS Technical Manual describes extensive damage in several cases as potentially 
involving partial collapse, where “Some of the frame elements have reached their ultimate 
capacity” and other locally severe conditions. A reasonable interpretation of partial collapse 
is a “Localized severe condition,” which ATC-20 suggests as grounds for a Restricted Use 
(yellow tag) posting, rather than red. We therefore judge that red tagging corresponds to the 
complete or collapse damage states, but not to the extensive damage state. 
3.4.2 Assessment of data processing facility structural system 
The data processing facility is a single story building comprised of two parts – a 
computer area on the west and an office area on the east.  Both areas have small penthouses 
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above the roof of the single story.  The original structural drawings of the building are dated 
1973 and the building was probably designed according to the 1970 Uniform Building Code 
(UBC) provisions.  The 56,320 square-foot computer area is a box structure (256 feet by 220 
feet) fully enclosed by double-layered reinforced concrete shear walls on the perimeter.  The 
two layers of shear walls are 9-1/4-inch and 10-inch thick, and are separated by a 4-3/4-inch 
gap filled with Styrofoam.  Reinforcement is provided either in the form of a single layer #4 
horizontal and vertical rebar mesh spaced at 8 inches or two layers with 16 inch spacing.  
There are also some 12-inch thick interior shear walls.  The foundation underneath the 
computer area consists of drilled concrete-filled steel piles grouped together in pile groups 
with 40-inch to 58-inch deep pile caps.  The pile caps are tied together by a network of tie 
beams.  Lap splices with splice lengths of 36 times the bar diameter are provided for the wall 
rebar above the pile cap.  The dowels are embedded a distance of 24 times the bar diameter 
into the pile cap.  This indicates that the shear walls are quite well connected to the 
foundation in the computer area.  The reinforced concrete slab-on-grade is 6 inches thick.  
The roof slab is a reinforced concrete waffle slab with 30-inch by 30-inch pans typically, 
with a joist depth of 2 ft 8 inches.  The minimum thickness of the slab is 12 inches.  It is 
reinforced with #4 rebar at 12 inches on center each way at the bottom, and 6x6 welded wire 
mesh at the top.  The penthouse, with an area of 12,312 square feet, is enclosed by 10 inch 
thick shear walls that rest on beams at the roof slab of the main structure.  The wall in 
combination with the floor beam acts as a deep beam spanning between gravity columns.  
Interior gravity columns supporting the roof are made of reinforced concrete and are square 
or rectangular in shape with dimensions varying between 24 inches by 24 inches and 40 
inches by 40 inches.  The lateral force-resisting system of the computer area, comprising of 
the long perimeter double-layered shear walls and a very stiff rigid diaphragm in the form of 
the waffle slab, is so robust that there is little likelihood, if any, of the computer area of the 
building being red-tagged following an earthquake.  Hence, no detailed analysis is performed 
of the computer area of the structure. 
The lateral force-resisting system of the office area, however, is unlike that of the 
computer area and needs close evaluation.  The office area is essentially a steel structure with 
concrete encasement for a few key members.  It is a very light structure.  The roof slab of the 
single-story structure is composed of vermiculite concrete on metal deck with a weight of just 
9 pounds per square foot  The weight of the supporting steel framework is about 8 pounds per 
square foot for a total roof weight of just 17 pounds per square foot.  The office area is 
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bordered on the west by the double-layered reinforced concrete shear wall of the computer 
area structure.  The lateral force-resisting system of the office area consists of perimeter steel 
moment-resisting frames on the remaining three faces of the building and the computer area 
shear wall on the west face.  The moment-frame columns consist of steel members (size 
W14x228) typically with box sections at the north-east and south-east corners.  The moment-
frame beams consist of steel W30x99 sections embedded in 7-foot-2-inch deep by 2-foot-0-
inch wide reinforced concrete spandrel beams.  These spandrels are far stiffer and stronger 
than the columns, and as a result any earthquake damage to the frames is likely to take the 
form of plastic hinges at the top (below the bottom of the spandrel beam) and bottom of 
columns.  Plastic-hinge formation in columns prior to the formation of hinges in the beams is 
considered a nonductile failure mechanism and is not desirable for earthquake resistance.  
The yielding in the columns could significantly reduce their gravity load-carrying capacity 
risking the ability of the structure to remain stable under its own self-weight.  In 1973 
(around the time the building was constructed), the concept of ductility was not well-
understood. Present-day standard practice and code requirement of strong column-weak 
beam had not yet been adopted.  The presence of the spandrels, presumably for architectural 
purposes, hinders the flexural rotation at the beam-column joint needed for the ductile 
response of a moment-frame system.  Even in the absence of the spandrels, the moment-
frame system used to resist lateral forces in the office area would have required ultrasonic 
testing of the welds connecting the beams to the columns and visual inspection of other 
features that caused brittle cracking in many steel moment-frames during the 1994 
Northridge Earthquake, especially in frames with deep beams of the kind used in this 
building.  The presence of the spandrels, while possibly protecting the beam-column 
connection from being loaded severely, would transfer the locations of the plastic hinges to 
the columns.  This is an equally undesirable failure mechanism if not more than the brittle 
beam-column weld fracture mechanism.  
While the spandrels are well reinforced with four #11 top and bottom bars and #5 bars at 
10 inches side-face bars and two-piece overlapping #5 stirrups (with 90 degree bends) spaced 
at 10 inches, concrete spalling is still possible under a strong earthquake as a result of 
insufficient confinement.  It should be mentioned, however, that despite these weaknesses, 
the magnitude 5.9 Whittier Narrows earthquake of 1987 that occurred at a distance of less 
than 1 mile from the building reportedly caused no visible damage to the structure, according 
to a past study of the building provided by the utility. The roof slab is anchored into the 
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concrete spandrels on three of the building faces and into the computer area shear wall on the 
west face.  The connection consists of a ¼-inch-thick bent steel plate with two ¾-inch-
diameter anchor bolts spaced at 24 inches on center typically and embedded 6 inches into the 
concrete.  The horizontal leg of the bent plate is welded to the metal deck.  The roof slab in 
the computer area is at a different elevation than the roof slab in the office area.  As a result, 
while there is some chance of pounding occurring in the east-west direction if large roof 
displacements occur, it is unlikely that there would be any load-sharing between the office 
area structure and the computer area structure in the east-west direction.  In the north-south 
direction however, the shear wall at the interface will provide lateral resistance to the motion 
of the office area structure.  No shear studs have been provided in the beams supporting the 
roof slab.  The metal deck is welded to the steel beams.  A few struts and a couple of 
horizontal steel braces are provided to improve the performance of the roof diaphragm, 
especially at the west end where it is attached to the computer area shear wall.  The steel 
columns are founded on spread footings.   At the west end of the single-story office structure, 
a penthouse (area of 2,223 square feet) rises above the roof.  It is supported by shear walls on 
all four sides.  The penthouse floor slab is 12 inch thick and is made of reinforced concrete 
with #5 rebar spaced at 10 inches in the short direction and at 18 inches in the long direction 
top and bottom.  The penthouse roof is similar to the main roof, consisting of vermiculite 
concrete on metal deck supported by steel framework. 
2. Other known details about the structure and its foundations 
The following are some key details of the structural design of the data processing facility: 
(a) Possibly designed per Uniform Building Code, UBC 1970. 
(b) Design loads: roof live load unknown;  
(c) Built areas: computer area of 56,320 square feet at the 1st floor and roof, with a 
12,312 square foot penthouse; office area of 22,400 square feet at the 1st floor and roof, with 
a 2,223 square-foot penthouse; overall dimensions of the computer area: 256 feet (north-
south) by 220 feet (east-west); overall dimensions of the office area: 160 feet (north-south) 
by 152 feet (east-west); nominal story height is 17 feet 8 inches in the computer area and 14 
feet 10 inches in the office area.   
(d) A 1972 foundation investigation report provided by the utility indicates that the site is 
underlain by fill soils, one to six feet in thickness, consisting of silt, clay, sand, silty sand, and 
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clayey sand. The upper natural soils were only moderately firm at the moisture content 
determined from exploration borings. The soils were found to be generally firm below a 
depth of ten feet, but contained some softer layers. Water was measured in the borings at 
depths of 20 to 24 feet below the existing grade.  The report recommended the use of driven 
friction piling to provide support for the building with minimum settlement.  Compaction was 
recommended for the soil supporting the slab on grade. 
(e) Structural drawings provide three options for drilled piers: concrete-filled step-
tapered steel shell pile with diameter varying from 9-3/8-inch at the bottom to 14-1/8-inch at 
the top, concrete-filled steel pipe with a diameter of 12 inches, and precast prestressed 
concrete pile with a diameter of 12 inches – each with a downward load-carrying capacity of 
160,000 pounds.  The foundation investigation report suggested a lateral load-carrying 
capacity of 12,000 pounds for 16-inch diameter piles. 
(f) Rebar #6 and above:  ASTM A432 Grade 60; #3 through #5 bars: ASTM A615 Grade 
40; wire mesh: ASTM A185. 
(g) Reinforced concrete with 28-day compressive cylinder strength of 3,000 pounds per 
square inch. 
(h) Light-weight vermiculite concrete 28-day compressive cylinder strength of 150 
pounds per square inch. 
(i) Structural steel:  ASTM A36; Typical bolts: ¾-inch diameter ASTM A-307 typical; 
welding:  E60 or E70 series electrodes.  
(j) There are no seismic joints in the building. 
For the data processing facility, we estimate that the peak ground acceleration 
corresponding to a 1% probability of this facility being red-tagged is in excess of 3g; none of 
the scenario earthquakes examined here is estimated to produce anywhere near this level of 
shaking. The probability of a red tag if the data processing facility experienced 0.9g of 
shaking (the median PGA in the most severe scenario event considered here) is estimated to 
be less than 1 in 1 million, using the methodology described above. 
3.4.3 Qualitative assessment of grid control facility structural system 
Following is a general description of the structural components of the facility and 
observations of potential deficiencies. 
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(a) The original structural drawings (3 in number: 547550-547552) are dated 1957.   
(b) The structure consists of a foundation/first floor, a mezzanine second floor (covering only 
part of the overall plan area), and a roof.  It is a box-like structure with 12-inch-thick 
reinforced concrete shear walls on all four faces on the perimeter. 
(c) The first floor measures 63 feet (N-S direction) by 74 feet (E-W direction), or 4,662 total 
sq. ft.  The second floor (on the western half of the structure) measures 63 feet (N-S 
direction) by 31 ft 7 inches (E-W direction), or 1,990 total sq. ft.  There are two small 
areas on the north-east and south-east corners that house mechanical equipment (about 16 
ft 8 inches by 14 ft 9 inches and 11 ft 5 inches by 11 ft 8 inches, respectively).  These 
areas are bounded on two sides by the perimeter shear walls and are enclosed by 8-inch-
thick walls elsewhere. The roof area is the same as first floor area. 
(d) The second floor slab braces the west shear wall along its full length, but only about half 
of the north and south shear walls.  The north-east and south-east corners of the perimeter 
shear walls are also braced by the mechanical slabs. 
(e) The floor-to-floor heights are 10 ft 11 inches at the first story and 12 ft 9 inches at the 
second story.  Thus the perimeter shear walls are unbraced a total height of about 23 ft 8 
inches at some locations. 
(f) The slab-on-grade is 6 inches thick with one layer of #3 rebar at 18 inch centers each 
way. 
(g) The second-floor slab consists of 3-1/2-inch-thick reinforced concrete slab supported by 4 
inch wide joist-like bridging (1 ft, 5-1/2-inch deep). The bridging has one #4 bar top and 
bottom.  The bridging runs east-west (slab spans one-way in the north-south direction).  
Slab reinforcement consists of #3 bars at 15 inches on center (one layer) in the span 
direction and one #3 bar each side of the joist in the orthogonal direction.  The east ends 
of the joists connect to a steel girder (27 WF 94) that is encased in concrete.  The steel 
girder is supported by three steel gravity columns (10 WF 89), one in the interior encased 
in concrete and two embedded within the north and south shear walls. 
(h) The roof slab consists of 6-inch-thick concrete spanning one-way in the north-south 
direction and supported by concrete beams that connect to the perimeter east and west 
shear walls at one end and an interior steel plate girder at the other end.  The steel plate 
girder is encased in concrete and connects to the three steel columns.  Slab reinforcement 
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consists of #4 bars at 7-inch centers bottom at mid-span in the span direction and #4 bars 
at 11-inch centers top at the support locations.  In addition, the bottom bars are bent 
upward at the supports to increase the support top reinforcement. 
(i) Shear-wall reinforcement consists of #4 bars at 13-inch centers each way, each face, 
typically.  Dowels have been shown for shear wall connection with foundation.  Slab 
dowels (#3 bars at 18-inch centers) are shown between the shear walls and the slab-on-
grade.  Slab top reinforcement at the second floor and roof has been shown hooked into 
the shear walls.  No boundary elements have been provided in the shear walls and 
probably not needed in a squat wall situation such as this.  General notes specify 
minimum splices and laps in reinforcing to be as follows:  (i) Top bars, beams, and 
girders:  36 x bar diameter.  (ii) Column verticals: 30 x bar diameter.  (iii) Others:  25 x 
bar diameter.  All of these seem adequate. 
(j) Concrete strength used: 2000 psi at 28-days. 
(k) Steel used: ASTM A-15, intermediate grade steel. 
(l) Foundation: spread footings with bearing value of 2500 psf. 
The following potential deficiencies were identified: 
(a) Reinforcement in shear walls is less than minimum requirements specified in current code 
(ACI 318-2005). The behavior of the shear walls is potentially not ductile enough. 
(b) One-foot-thick shear walls are unsupported for a height of 23 ft 9 inches for some length 
of the wall (about 30 feet long).  Out-of-plane stability of walls should be evaluated. 
3.4.4 Qualitative assessment of backup data facility structural system 
The lateral force-resisting system is a mixed system with braced frames in the second 
story transferring the seismic forces to precast concrete wall panels at the first story in the 
north-south direction, and to precast wall panels as well as a couple of cast-in-place shear 
wall segments at the first story in the east-west direction.  The braces consist of 10-inch tube 
steel sections and can be expected to perform reasonably well with regard to resisting 
buckling. 
Both the braced frames and the precast wall panels are well distributed in both directions 
at the second story and first story, respectively.  There is a good amount of redundancy in the 
lateral force-resisting elements with nine braced frame bays in the short direction (east-west), 
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and eight braced frame bays in the long direction (north-south) at the second story. Likewise, 
the structure is largely wrapped up by the precast wall panels which double up as the façade 
of the structure at the first story.  The lateral force-resisting system is stiffer, and possibly 
more ductile and stronger as well in the east-west direction (short direction of the building) as 
a result of the presence of the 12-inch-thick cast-in-place shear walls in the interior of the 
building, in addition to the precast wall panels on the perimeter.  
The performance of buildings with concrete tilt-up shear wall panels in the 1971 San 
Fernando Valley earthquake and the 1994 Northridge earthquake has been found to be poor 
with many instances of total building collapses as a result of the failure of the panel-to-floor 
slab connections that are typically embedded plates or angles anchored into the panels 
through studs and welded to the end angle supporting the concrete slab on metal deck.  These 
anchors in concrete exhibit low ductility and the repeat cyclic loading from an earthquake can 
quite easily pry the anchors loose leading to a brittle failure of the connection, and 
subsequent collapse of the shear wall panels.  The following excerpt is taken from a March 
1994 EQE summary report following the Northridge earthquake: 
Several new business parks throughout the San Fernando Valley were 
severely damaged. One business park had extensive structural damage to all of 
its roughly one dozen buildings. The two-story structures were steel framed and 
were enclosed with two-story-high, reinforced concrete, precast tilt-up panels. 
The first-floor sections of the tilt-up panels failed, and finished elements of the 
building interiors were extensively damaged [see Figure 3-98 and Figure 3-99]. 
Prior to the earthquake, the buildings housed computer centers and other 
service operations. One week after the earthquake, most of the buildings had 
been completely evacuated. 
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Figure 3-98. Damage to tilt-up construction during the Northridge earthquake – this section of tilt-up 
wall pulled away from the rest of this high-technology company’s corporate computer center. There was 
severe damage to the interior as a result.  Source: EQE International (1994). 
 
  
Figure 3-99. Damage to tilt-up construction during the Northridge earthquake – The wall of this office 
tilt-up nearly fell away during the earthquake. It has been braced, and a temporary tie to the adjoining 
wall has been installed until more permanent repair can be made. The interior of the second floor was 
almost completely destroyed (as shown in the photograph on the left).  Source:  EQE International (1994). 
 
There are many such instances of the poor performance of precast tilt-up construction 
during earthquakes and for a critical facility, a more robust and ductile structural system 
should be in place. 
Finally, it is to be noted that the concrete slabs at the second floor and the roof are sturdy 
enough to act as rigid diaphragms and can be expected to transfer the seismic inertial forces 
reliably to the vertical components of the lateral force-resisting system and retrofit schemes 
can certainly take advantage of this fact. 
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4 RISK ANALYSIS 
4.1 RISK ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
4.1.1 Purpose of the risk analysis 
The purpose of the risk analysis is to estimate two probabilities: (1) that operational 
failure occurs to both GCF and BDF in a single earthquake at least once during the next 5 
years, and (2) that operational failure occurs to both DPF and BDF in a single earthquake at 
least once during the next five years. The risk analysis uses as its input the products of the 
seismic hazard analysis and the vulnerability analysis.  
4.1.2 Overview of the risk analysis mathematics 
To perform the risk analysis, we combine the results of the seismic hazard analysis and 
the vulnerability analysis as follows. For the benefit of the nontechnical reader we summarize 
the methodology as follows.  
From the seismic hazard analysis, we have for each earthquake scenario an estimate of 
the probability distribution of shaking at each site. From the vulnerability analysis, we have 
estimated the probability of operational failure, given any particular level of shaking 
intensity. We multiply the failure probability given a particular level of shaking intensity, 
times the probability of the site experiencing exactly that level of shaking intensity in that 
earthquake, and sum over all possible shaking intensities in that earthquake. The result is an 
estimate of the failure probability for each facility, given the earthquake scenario. If we 
denote by PA the probability that facility A fails in the earthquake, PB denotes the failure 
probability of facility B in the same earthquake, and PAB denotes the probability that both 
facilities A and B fail in the same earthquake, then we can estimate PAB as 
 PAB = PA x PB (4) 
This equation assumes that the failure of the two facilities is independent, that is, given 
the shaking at each site, the failure of one facility has no effect on the failure probability of 
the other, a reasonable assumption where the facilities are not identical and are not 
construction by the same contractor at the same time. For each earthquake scenario we also 
have estimated the mean annual rate at which such a scenario occurs; let that rate be denoted 
by Ri, where i is an index to denote the scenario (a counting number 1, 2, … N), and where N 
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denotes the number of earthquake scenarios considered. We multiply the failure probability 
given the scenario earthquake, PAB, times the rate at which the scenario earthquake occurs, 
Ri, and sum over all scenario earthquakes. Letting R denote the total mean annual rate at 
which both facilities A and B fail in a single earthquake, and letting PAB,i denote the failure 
probability for scenario i, we can estimate  
 R = R1 x PAB,1 + R2 x PAB,2 + … RN x PAB,N  (5) 
If we denote by PT the probability that both facilities 1 and 2 will fail at least once in a single 
earthquake during a period of T years (we use T = 5 years), then PT can be estimated as  
  PT=5  = 1 – e–5R (6) 
where e denotes Euler’s number, approximately 2.718. For example, if R = 0.01 (i.e., failure 
will occur on average 0.01 times per year, or on average once every 100 years), then in 5 
years the probability that facilities 1 and 2 will both fail in a single earthquake is given by 1 – 
2.718–0.05, or PT=5 = 0.049, or slightly less than 5% probability. (This is merely an illustrative 
example.) 
4.2 RISK ANALYSIS RESULTS 
4.2.1 System-level fragility 
Grid control facility. Under current conditions, it is estimated that the grid control facility 
is more likely than not to fail at least temporarily when subjected to PGA is excess of 0.60g, 
primarily because of equipment damage. In this facility, it makes little difference if damage 
to identical components located in the same location and orientation is assumed to be 
perfectly correlated or uncorrelated. The single most effective mitigation measure for this 
facility would be to anchor the electric fuel pump and day tank, and to provide spacers for the 
starter motor batteries. If these components were to be made seismically rugged, doing so 
would increase to 0.71g the PGA at which failure is more likely than not. By strengthening 
all components identified here as possible weak links, the PGA associated with 50% failure 
probability is increased to 0.80g. See Figure 4-1a. 
Data processing facility. Under current conditions, it is estimated that the data processing 
facility is more likely than not to fail at least temporarily when subjected to PGA is excess of 
0.25g, primarily because of equipment damage. If damage to identical components in the 
same location and orientation are assumed to uncorrelated, failure is more likely. The single 
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most effective mitigation measure for this facility would be to mitigate the tape silos, either 
by seismic restraint (if that is possible for these pieces of equipment) or by relocating them at 
a seismically stable location. If the tape silos could be made seismically rugged, doing so 
would increase to 0.33g the PGA at which failure is more likely than not. By strengthening 
all components identified here as possible weak links, the PGA associated with 50% failure 
probability is increased to 0.85g. Note that we have assumed that damage to the tape silos is 
perfectly correlated—if one fails, all fail, which we deem reasonable given their proximity. 
See Figure 4-1b. 
Backup data facility. Under current conditions, it is estimated that the backup data 
facility is more likely than not to fail at least temporarily when subjected to PGA is excess of 
0.30g, primarily because of equipment damage. As with the data processing facility, if 
damage to identical components in the same location and orientation is assumed to be 
uncorrelated, failure probability is higher. As with the data processing facility, if the tape 
silos could be made seismically rugged, doing so would increase to 0.45g the PGA at which 
failure is more likely than not. By strengthening all components identified here as “possible 
weak links,” the PGA associated with 50% failure probability is increased to 0.85g. See 
Figure 4-1c.  
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Figure 4-1. Estimated overall fragility of individual facilities: (a) grid control facility, (b) data processing 
facility, and (c) backup data facility. 
 
4.2.2 System failure probability  
The probability that both the data processing facility and the backup facility will fail in a 
single earthquake in the next five years is estimated to be 0.4%. The probability that both the 
grid control facility and the backup facility will fail in a single earthquake in the next five 
years is estimated to be 0.05%. By remediating all items notes in Section 3 as “possible weak 
links,” the probabilities of either failure are estimated to be less than 1 in 100,000. Details are 
shown in Table 4-1. 
Table 4-1. Risk analysis results: estimated failure probability within the next 5 years 
Conditions Data processing 
facility 
Backup data 
facility 
Grid control 
facility 
Data processing and 
backup 
Grid control and 
backup 
Current  0.055 0.032 0.008 0.004 0.0005
Remediate all 0.002 0.001 0.003 2 x 10-6 2 x 10-6
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5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Two primary computer centers and a backup facility that are operated by a southern 
California utility were examined to estimate the probability that a single earthquake to 
interrupt critical operations. A seismic hazard analysis was performed to identify all the 
earthquakes considered by the US Geological Survey that could affect all three facilities, and 
to estimate their occurrence probability and shaking at each facility. A systems analysis was 
performed to estimate the probability in each earthquake of either the buildings being 
rendered unsafe to occupy (red-tagged) or for their equipment to be damaged so that the 
facilities become inoperative.  
All three facilities are structurally robust, and most equipment has been seismically 
anchored or braced. A few key components lack seismic restraint, however. Their potential 
for failure produces a possibly unacceptable level of risk, on the order of 0.1% probability 
that grid control or data processing would fail in a single earthquake in the next five years. 
Remediating these remaining components is estimated to reduce risk to below 1 in 100,000. 
We recommend the utility consider doing so. These conclusions are based on the assumption 
that equipment anchorage observed in the facilities has been tested to ensure proper 
installation. If the utility has not done so already, we recommend that such tests be 
considered as well.  
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APPENDIX A:  
GRID CONTROL FACILITY FAULT TREE 
Grid Control Facility
Fails
Building is Red-
Tagged
Equipment 
Systems Fail
Uncontrolled 
Building Fire
Grid Control 
Equipment Fails
Building Support 
Systems Fail
1 2 3
Legend
Or gate: the event connected 
above occurs if any event 
connected below occurs
And gate: the event connected 
above occurs if all events 
connected below occur
Transfer symbol: tree 
continues elsewhere
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Uncontrolled 
Building Fire
Fire Response 
Fails Ignition
Fire Detection and 
Alarm Fails
Fire Suppression 
Fails
1
4 5
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Fire Suppression 
Fails
Halon Systems 
(Computer areas 
only)
Fire Water 
Systems Fail
Fire Extinguishers 
Fail 
Halon Tanks Fail
Connections to 
Smoke Detectors 
Fail
Water Supply Fails Automatic Sprinklers Fail
5
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Electric Power 
Fails
Power Supply 
Fails
Power Distribution 
Fails
Off-site Power 
Fails
On-site 
Emergency Power 
Fails
UPS Fails
Emergency 
Generator System 
Fails
Power Transfer 
Equipment Fails
Transformers Fail Switchgear and Breakers Fail
Conduit FailsDistribution Panels Fail
7
9 10
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HVAC and 
Equipment Cooling 
Fails
Ventilation Fails Air Conditioning Fails
Fans Fail Ductwork Fails
8
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APPENDIX B:  
DATA PROCESSING FACILITY FAULT TREE 
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Building Support 
Systems Fail
Electric Power 
Fails
Telecomm-
unications Fail
HVAC and 
Equipment Cooling 
Fails
Raised Access 
Floors Collapse
3
7 8
Suspended 
Ceilings Collapse
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Fire Suppression 
Fails
Halon Systems 
(Computer areas 
only)
Fire Water 
Systems Fail
Fire Extinguishers 
Fail 
Halon Tanks Fail
Connections to 
Smoke Detectors 
Fail
Water Supply Fails Automatic Sprinklers Fail
5
Preaction 
Sprinklers Fail
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Electric Power 
Fails
Power Supply 
Fails
Power Distribution 
Fails
Off-site Power 
Fails
On-site 
Emergency Power 
Fails
UPS Fails
Emergency 
Generator System 
Fails
Power Transfer 
Equipment Fails
Transformers Fail Switchgear and Breakers Fail
Conduit FailsDistribution Panels Fail
7
9 10
Battery Racks 
Serving Breakers 
Fail
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HVAC and 
Equipment Cooling
Central HVAC 
Fails
Environmental AC 
Units Fail (data 
processing)
Chilled Water 
Distribution Fails 
(data processing)
8
11
 
UPS Fails
Rectifiers and 
Inverters Fails
Battery Cabinets 
Fail
Switchgear Fails
9
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Emergency 
Generator System 
Fails
Emergency 
Generator Fails Fuel Fails
Control Equipment 
Fails
Fuel Supply Tank 
Fails Fuel Pump Fails Piping Fails
10
Starter Motor 
Batteries Fail
Generator 
Switchgear Fails
 
Central HVAC 
Fails
Ventilation Fails Air Conditioning Fails
HVAC Control 
Equipment Fails
Fans Fail Ductwork Fails
Cooling Towers 
Fail Chillers Fail
11
Air Handlers Fail Pipes Fail
Off-site Water 
Supply Fails
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APPENDIX C:  
BACKUP DATA FACILITY FAULT TREE 
Backup Data 
Facility Fails
Building is Red-
Tagged
Equipment 
Systems Fail
Uncontrolled 
Building Fire
Grid Control and 
Data Processing 
Equipment Fails
Building Support 
Systems Fail
1 2 3
Legend
Or gate: the event connected 
above occurs if any event 
connected below occurs
And gate: the event connected 
above occurs if all events 
connected below occur
Transfer symbol: tree 
continues elsewhere
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Uncontrolled 
Building Fire
Fire Response 
Fails Ignition
Fire Detection and 
Alarm Fails
Fire Suppression 
Fails
1
4 5
  
Grid Control and 
Data Processing 
Equipment Fails
Mainframes Fail
Tape Silos Fail Printers Fail
Document 
Handling 
Equipment Fails
Communications 
Equipment Fails
2
Alternative Grid 
Control Computers 
Fail
Helpdesk 
Computers Fail
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Building Support 
Systems Fail
Electric Power 
Fails
Telecomm-
unications Fail
HVAC and 
Equipment Cooling 
Fails
Raised Access 
Floors Collapse
3
7 8
Suspended 
Ceilings Collapse
Building Control 
Center Fails
6
 
Fire Detection and 
Alarm fails
FCC Panel Fails Smoke Detectors Fail
Fire Alarm 
Indicating Devices 
Fail
4
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Fire Suppression 
Fails
Halon Systems 
(Computer areas 
only)
Fire Water 
Systems Fail
Fire Extinguishers 
Fail 
Halon Tanks Fail
Connections to 
Smoke Detectors 
Fail
Water Supply Fails Automatic Sprinklers Fail
5
Preaction 
Sprinklers Fail
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UPS Fails
Rectifiers and 
Inverters Fails
Battery Cabinets 
Fail
Switchgear Fails
9
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Emergency 
Generator System 
Fails
Emergency 
Generators Fail Fuel Fails
Control Equipment 
Fails
Fuel Supply Tank 
Fails
Fuel Pumps and 
Day Tanks Fails Piping Fails
10
Starter Motor 
Batteries Fail
Generator 
Switchgear Fails
Radiators Fail
Air Intake Fans 
Fail
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APPENDIX D: 
LIMITATIONS 
Sampling. The quantitative analysis relies on a sampling of equipment installation 
conditions at the three facilities. While fairly extensive, the sampling was not exhaustive. We 
did not inventory every piece of critical equipment at each facility, and document and assess 
the adequacy of the seismic restraint of each. Such an effort would have exceeded the time 
constraints. Instead, to generalize from the samples examined, we relied on statements of the 
expert building engineers present at the three walkthroughs. An error resulting from this 
simplification could cause the system failure probabilities estimated here to be either too high 
or too low, depending on whether an unexamined exception were more or less seismically 
resistant than is assumed here. We made several hundred observations and in no case did the 
statements of the experts appear to be contradicted by our observations, so we submit that 
this reliance is justifiable and any error likely to be small. Nonetheless, given importance of 
this issue, an exhaustive inspection should be performed. 
Some systems not examined in detail. We did not examine in detail equipment that the 
utility’s personnel told us were not critical to the continued operation of the facility. For 
example, we do not treat here ordinary offices at the grid control GCF, the Distributed 
Systems Lab at the data processing facility, or the Tape Library Room at the backup data 
facility. Conceivably the equipment in these rooms could be relevant to the post-earthquake 
operation of the facility, perhaps as redundant replacement equipment for damaged 
components. However, we submit that the judgment of the utility’s engineers that these 
rooms and equipment are non-critical is authoritative and justifiable. An error resulting from 
this assumption could cause the system failure probabilities estimated here to be either too 
high or too low. For example, if equipment in these labs could be quickly used as backup, 
then since we have ignored their presence our failure probability estimates are (to some 
perhaps limited extent) conservative, i.e., high. On the other hand, the error could go the 
other way: damage within these rooms could conceivably lead to damage elsewhere. For 
example, sprinklers could break or a fire could start in these spaces, causing sprinklers to 
discharge; the fire-suppression water could then leak into critical spaces and damage 
equipment.  
No mechanical testing. Many times in this report we state that items “appeared to be 
anchored,” or use similar verbiage. We observed bolt heads with nuts, and assumed but did 
 Analysis of Simultaneous Operational Failure of Critical Facilities due to Earthquake, for a California Utility 
 96 
not perform mechanical tests to confirm that the bolts were installed according to the 
engineer’s or manufacturer’s recommendations. Conceivably a contractor could have failed 
to install anchors according to the engineer’s or manufacturer’s recommendations, such as 
without epoxy in the hole. Mechanical testing of a number of these anchors should be 
performed to confirm the adequacy of installation.  
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APPENDIX E:  
DEFENSIBILITY AND STATE-OF-THE-ART ASPECTS OF THE STUDY 
E.1 HAZARD ANALYSIS 
The seismic hazard analysis was performed by experienced USGS personnel using the 
same earthquake rupture forecast and seismic attenuation relationships employed in the 2002 
National Seismic Hazard Maps, the official standard of the US Geological Survey. 
Furthermore, site soil information for the three facilities examined here was taken from an 
authoritative map created by the California Geological Survey for the purposes of seismic 
hazard analysis.  
Despite the authoritative and well established nature of the seismic hazard analysis, the 
present analysis contains state-of-the-art features as well. State-of-the-art software developed 
by the US Geological Survey and the Southern California Earthquake Consortium was used 
to create these estimates of shaking intensity. The software is called OpenSHA; the interested 
reader is referred to the OpenSHA web page, at www.opensha.org, and to a publication by 
Field et al. (2005). One new crucial component was developed by the USGS explicitly for 
projects such as the present one; it is used here in practice for the first time. This component, 
entitled IM_EventSetCalc.jar, is a Java application that produces a database of intensity 
measure levels for an arbitrary number of intensity measure types, intensity measure 
relationships, and sites of interest. In addition to these two features—the use of OpenSHA 
and the first practical use of a new component for OpenSHA—a third way in which the 
hazard analysis is state of the art is in the separation of inter- and intra-event variability of 
ground motion.  
Note that the new OpenSHA component IM_EventSetCalc.jar was not developed using 
the funds or under the contract of the present project. There is no contractual relationship 
between the USGS and Caltech or between the research sponsor and the USGS for purposes 
of the present project or the development of the new component. In fact, no other software 
was created for this project. USGS personnel checked the results of the new software’s 
calculations to ensure that the software was working properly and agreed with independent 
analysis. (Specifically, the calculations were validated against the 2002 USGS National 
Seismic Hazard Map rock-site calculations as in Figure 2a of Field et al. 2005). 
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E.2 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
Fault-tree analysis is a mature and well-established methodology for estimating the 
probability of an undesirable outcome. The interested reader is referred, for example, to 
Vesely et al.’s (1981) handbook on fault tree analysis, prepared under the auspices of the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Since at least the early 1990s, fault trees and closely related 
diagrams have been used to depict and assess the seismic reliability of various facilities other 
than nuclear power plants. The authors applied a version of fault-tree analysis to evaluating 
the seismic reliability of computer data centers and other facilities in National Science 
Foundation-sponsored research (Porter et al. 1993), and in practice used such a methodology 
for a large international financial institution to estimate the probability of simultaneous 
failure to two data centers conditioned on a few particular earthquake scenarios. In the later 
1990s, Johnson et al. (1999) developed extensive empirical quantitative information useful 
for applying the methodology, under the sponsorship of the National Science Foundation. 
Noteworthy in the Johnson et al. (1999) work is that empirical fragility information is 
provided for a wide variety of equipment components, and that most if not all seismic 
installation conditions that matter to the fragility of each component are clearly elucidated 
and appropriate adjustments to the basic fragility function are provided for each feature.  
Despite the credentials of fault-tree analysis, it seems likely that the present project is one 
is the first to use it to estimate the seismic reliability of multiple data centers while drawing 
on the empirical dataset provided by Johnson et al. (1999), or to apply the methodology to 
hundreds of thousands of earthquake scenarios. The present vulnerability analysis can 
therefore be said to be state-of-the-art in its use of fault tree analysis for data-center 
probabilistic seismic reliability assessment, especially with its strong empirical dataset.  
The structural analyses were performed by a licensed Structural Engineer using state-of-
the-art finite element software and a consensus methodology developed within the last 10 
years by the American Society of Civil Engineers for the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency.   
E.3 RISK ANALYSIS 
The mathematics of the risk analysis rely on two well-established mathematical 
principles: the theorem of total probability and the mathematics associated with a Poisson 
process, whose details will not be explained here. For the benefit of the technical reader, we 
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note that the assumption of earthquake occurrence as a Poisson process is common and 
furthermore is consistent with the 2002 National Seismic Hazard Mapping project.  
The state-of-the-art aspects of the seismic hazard analysis and the vulnerability analysis 
suggest that the overall study may be unprecedented in its rigor and sophistication: this may 
be the first time a fully probabilistic estimate has been performed of the simultaneous 
operational failure in two or more distant facilities in a single earthquake during a given 
planning period, considering both red-tagging and equipment damage, using hundreds of 
thousands of scenario earthquakes, state-of-the-art fault tree analysis, and broad empirical 
basis for the equipment fragility.  
 
